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Burnosky: 2-4-6-8 Who Do We Appreciate? The Third Circuit Scores a Touchdow

COMMENTS
2-4-6-8, WHO DO WE APPRECIATE? THE THIRD CIRCUIT
SCORES A TOUCHDOWN FOR STUDENT-ATHLETE
FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION: PUNISHING STUDENT-ATHLETES’ OFF-CAMPUS
SPEECH
The First Amendment is a continuous source of conflict within
the public school context.1 Schools wield vast discretionary authority to regulate student conduct.2 However, schools are not totally
immune from the dictates of the First Amendment.3 Schools must
comport with the First Amendment’s commands, albeit in a limited
way due to their unique position.4 Students’ social media presents
unique free speech problems in public schools because schools
have reached beyond the schoolhouse gate and disciplined students for off-campus remarks on social media.5
1. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969) (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gates.”), with
id. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting) (“I wish, therefore, wholly to disclaim any purpose
on my part to hold that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents,
and elected school officials to surrender control of the American public school
system to public school students.”).
2. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (majority opinion) (noting Supreme Court has
repeatedly upheld school’s broad authority to “prescribe and control conduct in
the schools”).
3. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“[Boards of
education] have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions,
but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.”).
4. See Curtis G. Bentley, Student Speech in Public Schools: A Comprehensive Analytical Framework Based on the Role of Public Schools in Democratic Education, 2009 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 1, 4 (2009) (arguing school’s basic mission is to educate students in
“essential democratic values of nonrepression and nondiscrimination”).
5. See B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 189 (3d Cir. 2020) [hereinafter Mahanoy III] (“[N]ew communicative technologies open new territories
where regulators might seek to suppress speech they consider inappropriate, uncouth, or provocative.”); Allison N. Sweeney, Note, The Trouble with Tinker: An Examination of Student Free Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 359, 365-66 (2018) (underscoring social media concerns in
terms of assessing student free speech rights in light of ease of transmitting information); see also Chris Fry, School Punishes Girl for Tweet From Home, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.courthousenews.com/school-punishesgirl-for-tweet-from-home/ [https://perma.cc/7QS6-4BE7] (discussing school’s decision to prohibit female student from attending prom and graduation because of
vulgar Tweet); Philip Lee, Expanding the Schoolhouse Gate: Public Schools (K-12) and
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Individuals have leveraged their publicity in order to promote
messages for centuries.6 Notably, Colin Kaepernick knelt during
the National Anthem to protest police brutality, sparking criticism
from some and praise from others.7 This trend is not limited to the
professional sports arena; even college athletes have used their platforms to promote social change.8 As the next generation of this
Nation’s citizens, high school athletes have a stake in being able to
use their platform to promote the messages they find most
important.9
the Regulation of Cyberbullying, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 831, 834 (2016) (arguing
cyberbullying, even if entirely off-campus, deserves diminished First Amendment
protections); Watch What You Tweet: Schools, Censorship, and Social Media, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST CENSORSHIP (Jan. 2, 2020), https://ncac.org/watch-what-you-tweetschools-censorship-and-social-media [https://perma.cc/8W45-U3VD] (discussing
fifteen instances when schools punished students for online, off-campus speech).
6. See Martin Luther King Jr., NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/
prizes/peace/1964/king/lecture/ [https://perma.cc/M3QH-WBWD] (last visited
Feb. 3, 2021) (explaining Martin Luther King Jr.’s involvement as pastor and member of executive committee for NAACP); Abolitionist Movement, HISTORY (last updated Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/abolitionistmovement [https://perma.cc/K9A4-PGZN] (listing famous abolitionists who used
status and public image to promote anti-slavery movement). Women’s rights advocacy, for example, has its roots in America’s earliest years with some presence in
England as well. See Allison Lange, Women’s Rights in the Early Republic, NAT’L WOMEN’S RIGHTS MUSEUM (2015), http://www.crusadeforthevote.org/early-republic
[https://perma.cc/Q99V-7Z3W] (explaining origins of early women’s rights movement). Abigail Adams advocated for more stringent legal protections and recognitions for women and England’s Mary Wollstonecraft wrote the groundbreaking The
Vindication of the Rights of Women. See id.
7. See Euan McKirdy, Colin Kaepernick Continues Kneeling Protest Ahead of 49ers
Opener, CNN (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/12/sport/colinkaepernick-nfl-opening-day-reaction-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/FUN7KCEC] (noting differing reactions from public figures and private citizens).
8. See Corbin McGuire, College Athletes Using Platforms to Speak Out on Social Justice Athletes, NCAA (Aug. 18, 2020), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/feature/college-athletes-using-platforms-speak-out-social-justice-issues
[https://perma.cc/5YCG-G3NS] (highlighting how college athletes promote social justice following NCAA’s new initiative educating athletes how to effectively
use their platform to promote change); Greta Anderson, On the Offensive and In the
Lead, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 2, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2020/07/02/athletes-push-and-achieve-social-justice-goals [https://perma.cc/
7JGX-XDRX] (explaining how nationally ranked college running back used platform to urge Alabama to change state flag).
9. See Barry Svrluga, Why Does It Matter When Athletes Speak Out? Just Ask the
Kids., WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/
2020/09/25/athlete-activism-children/ [https://perma.cc/72MH-ATN2]
(describing high school athletes’ reactions to professional athletes using platforms
to promote racial justice); see also About Us, SOUL, https://soulprograms.org/
about-us/ [https://perma.cc/EDJ5-HWZN] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (highlighting Student-Athletes Organized to Understand Leadership’s mission of promoting
education and leadership values in high school athletes).
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Exercises of free speech are consistently met with attempts to
stifle or chill speech because the First Amendment protects uncomfortable, controversial, and even downright hateful speech.10 High
school sports teams have stirred controversy by disciplining studentathletes for off-campus speech violating team rules.11 The Third
Circuit stood against this troubling trend in Mahanoy III by reversing a school district’s decision to uphold a cheerleader’s suspension
from the cheerleading squad for certain colorable, off-campus
messages on Snapchat.12 This trailblazing opinion starkly contrasts
other Courts of Appeals’ broad regulation of student speech regardless of where it originates, and may garner the Supreme
Court’s attention to finally determine whether the First Amendment protects off-campus speech.13
This Casenote discusses the Third Circuit’s recent decision in
Mahanoy III; explaining why its approach is most faithful to Supreme Court precedent and most protective of student-athlete free

10. See Freedom of Expression - ACLU Position Paper, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/other/freedom-expression-aclu-position-paper [https://
perma.cc/L7R5-GQDR] (“We should not give the government the power to decide
which opinions are hateful, for history has taught us that government is more apt
to use this power to prosecute minorities than to protect them.”); id. (“Throughout the 19th century, sedition, criminal anarchy and criminal conspiracy laws were
used to suppress the speech of abolitionists, religious minorities, suffragists, labor
organizers, and pacifists.”).
11. See Chris Fore, Top 5 Issues Getting Student-Athletes In Trouble On Social Media, COACH FORE, (Aug. 28, 2020), http://coachfore.org/2020/08/28/top-5-issuesgetting-student-athletes-in-trouble-on-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/V3X8HQ65] (surveying around two hundred high school coaches and finding 43% punished students based on their social media posts); High School That Dismissed Cheerleader From Team for Private Tweets Not Liable for Violating Her Free Speech Rights,
ROGERS & MOORE (Feb. 6, 2020), https://rogersmoorelaw.com/high-school-thatdismissed-cheerleader-from-team-for-private-tweets-not-liable-for-violating-her-freespeech-rights/ [https://perma.cc/XA6E-ZHGV] (outlining recent Fifth Circuit’s
decision to remove student for violating cheerleading team’s rules when coaches
found several tweets with expletives on her profile page); see also 3 JAMES A. RAPP,
EDUCATION LAW § 8.07(2)(b) (2020) (noting majority of states describe extracurriculars as privilege that school may revoke at any time).
12. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding school may not
regulate off-campus speech that does not use school resources or make observer
believe school sponsored off-campus speech). For further discussion on Mahanoy’s
holding, see infra notes 194-203 and accompanying text.
13. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 394 (5th Cir. 2015) (en
banc) (assuming school could punish off-campus student speech in certain circumstances); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 577 (4th Cir. 2011)
(applying sufficient nexus test to uphold school’s punishment of student for offcampus speech), cert denied 565 U.S. 1173 (2012); Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v.
Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying reasonable foreseeability
test to justify school’s punishment of off-campus speech).
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speech rights.14 Specifically, Section II discusses the history of Supreme Court student speech cases as well as various courts of appeals’ approaches.15 Next, Section III lays out the facts and
procedural history surrounding Mahanoy III.16 Section IV highlights the Third Circuit’s decision and rationale.17 Section V argues
Mahanoy III was properly decided for student-athletes’ First Amendment rights, but also made the only correct decision under applicable case law.18 Finally, Section VI discusses the potential
implications of the Third Circuit’s decision and the prospects of
eliciting a response from the Supreme Court.19
II. A BRIEF HISTORY

OF

STUDENT SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE

In 1791, the Founders amended the Constitution to include
the Free Speech Clause, which provides that “Congress shall make
no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech”.20 The Supreme Court
did not regularly decide cases on the basis of the First Amendment
until the early twentieth century when it applied it to the States.21
The Nation’s highest court has interpreted the First Amendment to
prohibit the government from censoring offensive or controversial
ideas.22 In Barnette, the Supreme Court added public schools to the
14. For further discussion of the Third Circuit’s compliance with Tinker and
other student speech caselaw, see infra notes 211-247 and accompanying text.
15. For further discussion of different approaches to off-campus speech, see
infra notes 60-125 and accompanying text.
16. For further discussion of facts and procedural history of Mahanoy III, see
infra notes 126-145 and accompanying text.
17. For further discussion of the Third Circuit’s holding that Tinker is inapplicable to off-campus speech, see infra notes 146-207 and accompanying text.
18. For further discussion and analysis of Third Circuit’s faithfulness to student speech caselaw, see infra notes 211-262 and accompanying text.
19. For further discussion of the Third Circuit decision’s impact and potential
for Supreme Court resolution of circuit split, see infra notes 275-308 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress or grievances.”).
21. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (holding First Amendment does not protect handing out papers urging resistance to war effort); Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (holding First Amendment does not shield
speech that disrupted war and draft effort); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919) (holding First Amendment does not protect speech advocating violent
overthrow of government); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (“[N]or shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (assuming Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prevents states from violating First Amendment).
22. See generally McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014) (“In short,
traditional public fora are areas [like public streets and sidewalks] that have histor-
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list of places where individuals preserve their First Amendment
rights.23 At the height of the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court
again faced a major public school speech case in Tinker.24
A. Tinker-ing with Tumultuous Times
In Tinker, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a
school’s decision to suspend students who wore black armbands in
opposition to the Vietnam War.25 When school officials learned
several students protested the war by wearing black armbands and
fasted at school during the holiday season, they began suspending
those who refused to remove the bands upon request.26 The students sought an injunction against the policy, which the district
court rejected and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed.27
The Supreme Court reversed, holding “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.”28 The Supreme Court differentiated wearing black armically been open to the public for speech activities.”); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343, 358 (2003) (holding government may not criminalize “even ideas the overwhelming majority of people find distasteful or discomforting”); Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (describing public streets and sidewalks as “quintessential” public forums where speech may not be regulated absent regulation narrowly
tailored to serve compelling governmental interest); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment,
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing how state may
not “prohibit dissemination of social, economic and political doctrine which a vast
majority of its citizens believe to be false and fraught with evil consequence”).
23. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion.”); see also id. at 631 (holding school’s justifiably important role
in promoting democratic values in students does not overcome students’ First
Amendment rights).
24. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(addressing peaceful student protest of American involvement in Vietnam War).
For further discussion of Tinker, see infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
25. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (detailing facts giving rise to case before Supreme Court).
26. See id. (noting school’s policy in response to students’ plans to protest
Vietnam War).
27. See id. at 504-05 (noting Eighth Circuit’s divided en banc opinion affirming
district court’s denial of injunctive relief).
28. Id. at 506 (stating First Amendment restrictions apply to public school
officials); see also Melissa C. Dickler, The Morse Quartet: Student Speech and the First
Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 362-63 (2007) (recounting Tinker’s famous
holding).
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bands from other permissibly proscribable forms of expression because the students merely wore armbands.29 The Tinker Court
relied heavily on lack of disturbance in its opinion.30 The Supreme
Court declared “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough” to supersede students’ free speech rights.31
Moreover, school officials may not proscribe expression by “the
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”32 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court held schools may only regulate speech that “materially and
substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”33
B. Limited Expansions of School Authority
A trilogy of Supreme Court cases recognized limited areas
where schools may regulate student expression outside of Tinker’s
standards.34 In Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser,35 the Supreme Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a school’s suspension of a
student who used sexual metaphor in his speech nominating another student for “student elective office.”36 The Fraser Court differentiated Tinker because the student’s speech here interfered with
“the work of the schools or the rights of other students.”37 Fraser
recognized schools must be afforded authority to discipline student
29. See id. at 508 (“The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or
disturbance.”). But see id. at 507-08 (maintaining school may regulate students’
hair length or aggressive behavior).
30. See id. at 508-11 (noting only five out of eighteen thousand students were
suspended and no classes were interrupted).
31. See id. (denying school’s authority to regulate any expression whatsoever
based on slightest apprehension); see also RAPP, supra note 11, § 9.04(2)(b)(i) (noting Tinker’s requirement of school showing more than undifferentiated fear).
32. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (emphasizing popularity of opinion may not
serve as basis for regulating certain speech).
33. Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)) (establishing appropriate standard for when schools may regulate student speech).
34. See Dickler, supra note 28, at 356 (noting trilogy of cases following Tinker
with “each govern[ing] a different category of speech”); see also RAPP, supra note
11, § 9.04(2)(b)(i) (“The core principles of Tinker remain unaltered, but are tempered by several important decisions—[Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse].”). For further discussion of Supreme Court extensions to Tinker’s substantial disruption
standard, see infra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
35. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). For further discussion of Fraser, see infra notes 36-39
and accompanying text.
36. See id. at 677-78 (stating facts leading to student’s suspension and noting
various reactions to speech including embarrassment and teacher pausing scheduled lesson to discuss speech).
37. See id. at 680 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508) (underscoring non-disruptive, passive message associated with wearing black armband); see also Dickler, supra

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol28/iss2/4

6

Burnosky: 2-4-6-8 Who Do We Appreciate? The Third Circuit Scores a Touchdow

2021]

2-4-6-8, WHO DO WE APPRECIATE?

375

speech when it disrupts others’ rights.38 Fraser buttressed Tinker’s
implicit holding: students’ free speech rights “are not automatically
coextensive” with those of adults.39
The next chapter in expanding school authority over student
speech came with Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier.40 The Supreme
Court considered whether school officials could constitutionally remove pages from “Spectrum,” a school-funded, student-run newspaper.41 The controversial issue included stories about student
pregnancies and divorce’s effects on some students.42 The journalism teacher followed standard procedure in submitting the proposed issue to the principal, who published all but the divorce and
pregnancy stories.43
The Kuhlmeier Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s argument
that the school’s actions violated the First Amendment because
Spectrum was a public forum.44 Kuhlmeier emphasized the schoolsupervised nature of Spectrum by holding schools may exercise “authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions,
and other expressive activities students, parents, and members of
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school.”45 The Kuhlmeier Court concluded schools may exercise
“editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
note 28, at 365 (emphasizing Fraser’s focus on rights of others rather than substantial disrupting).
38. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (emphasizing school’s important mission of inculcating civility and appropriate behavior in students).
39. See id. at 683 (holding schools may appropriately “prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms . . . in the classroom or in school assembly” (quoting New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985))). But see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506
(implying First Amendment precepts protecting students are equivalent to those
protecting adult teachers).
40. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). For further discussion of Kuhlmeier, see infra notes
41-46 and accompanying text.
41. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 262-66 (describing main issue before Supreme
Court and describing Spectrum as published through journalism class and entirely
funded by school board).
42. See id. at 263 (discussing contents of last proposed issue of year).
43. See id. at 262-63 (discussing how principal was concerned with releasing
identity of students in divorce story and lack of parental consent as well as concerns with delaying publication).
44. See id. at 267-70 (“[The school district] ‘reserved the forum for its intended purpos[e],’ . . . as a supervised learning experience for journalism students. Accordingly, school officials were entitled to regulate the contents of
Spectrum in any reasonable matter. . . . [I]t is this standard, rather than our decision in Tinker, that governs this case.” (emphasis added) (quoting Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983))).
45. Id. at 271 (underscoring activity’s designation as part of curriculum and
teacher supervision that renders activity subject to school regulation).
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school-sponsored expressive activities” if doing so is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”46
The trilogy concluded with Morse v. Frederick.47 The Supreme
Court upheld a principal’s suspension of a student who refused to
take down a banner promoting drug use as violative of the First
Amendment.48 Students could see the banner during a “schoolsanctioned and school-sponsored event” and the principal believed
it encouraged illegal drug use.49 The Morse Court described the
televised event as a school event because it took place during school
hours, was “an approved social event or school trip,” and the student stood with his peers.50 The Morse Court affirmed the school’s
authority to regulate such messages because of the danger that
drugs pose to students.51 Morse justified a school’s authority to “restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting
illegal drug use.”52
C. Internet Speech and First Amendment Analyses
The Supreme Court has offered some clarification on how the
internet affects the First Amendment amidst boundary issues.53 In
Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court analyzed a First Amendment
challenge in the early years of the internet, noting its quickly expanding nature and wide availability to millions of people.54 The
46. Id. at 273 (stating schools may exercise some control over expression conducted in school-sponsored venues); see also Dickler, supra note 28, at 368 (noting
Court’s additional exception to substantial disruption standard to less stringent
standard comparable to rational basis review).
47. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). For further discussion of Morse, see infra notes 48-52
and accompanying text.
48. See id. at 396 (explaining principal’s reaction to seeing large studentplaced banner she believed promoted illicit drug use).
49. See id. at 396-97 (noting students unfurled banner reading “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS” during Olympic torch-bearing event that passed by school as camera crews
passed by).
50. See id. at 400-01 (justifying decision to classify case as school speech case).
51. See id. at 402, 407-08 (noting two reasonable interpretations of banner
promoting illegal drug use and citing increasing dangerousness of drugs across
country).
52. Id. at 408 (holding school officials may regulate student speech promoting illicit drug use because of important governmental interest in curtailing childhood drug use); see also Dickler, supra note 28, at 356 (restating Morse’s holding).
53. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (considering
First Amendment challenge to punishing sex offenders who accessed website
where offender knew minor children could become members or create personal
webpage); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (considering First Amendment
challenge to two provisions criminalizing knowing transmission of sexually explicit
material to minors).
54. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 852-53 (“From the publishers’ point of view, [the
internet] constitutes a vast platform from which to address and hear from a world-
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Supreme Court aligned itself with prior precedent that no separate
or different method of analysis governed Internet speech because
the Internet makes individuals “town criers.”55
In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
First Amendment analyses should not change simultaneously with
the expansion of the digital age.56 After acknowledging the importance of the internet and social media in the exchange of ideas,
Packingham proceeded to apply traditional First Amendment analyses to the speech at issue.57 Reno and Packingham argue courts
should address free speech claims involving the internet with particular reliance on established First Amendment principles and only
slight context-specific modifications.58
D. Taking a Swing at It: Circuit Court Applications and
Expansions of Supreme Court Groundwork
The Supreme Court laid significant groundwork on the various
dimensions of student speech cases.59 Federal appellate courts
have heard cases with fact patterns that do not neatly align with any
specific Supreme Court case, particularly in the off-campus speech
domain.60 Various circuits have carved out special off-campus exceptions to Supreme Court caselaw because the Supreme Court has
not spoken on the subject since Morse.61 Most courts apply a reawide audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers.”); id. at 868
(describing Internet as “vast democratic forum”).
55. See id. at 870 (holding Supreme Court precedent supports conclusion to
not carve out qualification to internet speech as specific forum).
56. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736 (“[T]he Court must exercise extreme
caution before suggesting the First Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in that medium.”).
57. See id. at 1736-38 (applying traditional First Amendment intermediate
scrutiny test for content-based speech restrictions).
58. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 180 (3d Cir. 2020) (describing lesson of both
cases as requiring courts to “carefully adjust and apply—but not discard—our existing precedent”).
59. See, e.g., RAPP, supra note 11, § 9.04(2)(b) (noting Tinker’s substantial disruption standard applies where Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse do not). For further
discussion of Supreme Court precedent laying out student speech cases, see supra
notes 25-52 and accompanying text.
60. See Stephen Wermiel, Tinker at 50: Student Activism on Campus: Tinkering
with Circuit Conflicts Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1135, 1136
(2020) (expressing one judge’s concern for clarity on student speech from Supreme Court). For further discussion of different circuits’ student speech tests
and holdings, see infra notes 60-125 and accompanying text.
61. See generally C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir.
2016) (“Each of these leading cases [Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse], however,
concerns only a school’s ability to regulate students’ on-campus speech. Whether
and how these precedents apply to off-campus speech are questions the Supreme
Court has yet to answer.”).
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sonable foreseeability or sufficient nexus test, or apply Tinker without articulating a specific standard.62
1. Saw It Coming a Mile Away: Reasonable Foreseeability
Many circuit courts apply the reasonable foreseeability test in
off-campus student speech cases.63 The Second Circuit laid out this
standard in Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ.64 In Wisniewski, a student used an instant messaging system to create a picture of
a handgun firing a bullet through a teacher’s head with blood spatters as his icon with the words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen” in the background.65 The student was charged with “endangering the health
and welfare of other students and staff,” and was suspended for a
month.66
The Second Circuit argued even if Tinker applied, the student’s
speech was unprotected speech and “constitute[d] student conduct
that pose[d] a reasonably foreseeable risk that the icon would come
to the attention of the school” and cause a substantial disruption.67
Wisniewski held the student’s off-campus speech did not insulate
him from school discipline.68 If a reasonable person could foresee
the speech reaching school officials with the risk of causing a substantial disruption, then school officials may regulate it.69 Applying
its new reasonable foreseeability test, the Second Circuit concluded
62. See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying sufficient
nexus test); Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.
2007) (adopting reasonable foreseeability test). For further discussion of the
Third Circuit’s criticism of these approaches, see infra notes 185-193 and accompanying text.
63. For further discussion of the reasonable foreseeability test, see infra notes
64-82 and accompanying text.
64. See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 34 (establishing reasonable foreseeability test).
65. Id. at 35-36 (noting Mr. VanderMolen was student’s English teacher and
student’s actions were in response to school’s recent zero-tolerance policy on
threats of violence).
66. Id. (noting hearing officer’s decision icon was threatening and violated
school rules and recommending suspension).
67. Id. at 38-39 (justifying school’s authority to regulate unprotected speech
regardless of whether Tinker applies).
68. See id. at 39 (“The fact that [the student’s] creation and transmission of
the IM icon occurred away from school property does not necessarily insulate him
from school discipline.”).
69. See id. (holding reasonably foreseeable that student’s icon would reach
school officials); see also Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir.
1979) (supporting contention off-campus speech can satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption standard).
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the threatening nature and “extensive distribution of” the icon
made it reasonably foreseeable to reach the school.70
In Doninger v. Niehoff,71 the Second Circuit relied on Wisniewski
to consider whether a student’s off-campus blog post created a foreseeable risk of a substantial disruption of school environment.72
The controversy arose from rumors the school would be cancelling
an event, called “Jamfest,” which student council members helped
plan.73 Plaintiff posted on her blog, encouraging other students to
“piss [the principal] off” because “Jamfest [was] cancelled due to
douchebags in central office.”74 When the principal discovered the
blog post, she “effectively prohibited” the student from running for
office during her senior year.75 The student filed suit in district
court alleging the school had violated her First Amendment
rights.76
Surprisingly, Doninger found the on-versus off-campus distinction irrelevant to determining a school’s authority to regulate
speech.77 Applying Wisniewski’s first prong, the court concluded it
was reasonably foreseeable that the student’s speech would reach
school because the student attempted to motivate students into calling the principal.78 The court found the school district had satisfied Tinker and the reasonable foreseeability test for several
reasons.79 Specifically, the student’s use of “potentially incendiary
language” was offensive and disruptive to the school environment
because the student’s misleading blog led to confusion within the
70. Id. at 39-40 (stating fifteen students over three weeks saw icon).
71. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008) (relying on Wisniewski’s reasonable foreseeability test).
72. See id. at 43 (considering whether Tinker applied to off-campus speech
through Wisniewski).
73. Id. at 44 (describing dispute that brought case before court).
74. Id. at 45 (reproducing student’s blog post). For further discussion of how
this blog post and other off-campus speech are different than B.L.’s Snap, see infra
notes 292-296 and accompanying text.
75. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 46 (noting principal’s refusal to officially acknowledge student’s candidacy).
76. See id. at 46-47 (explaining student’s civil action against school).
77. See id. at 48-49 (“[T]erritoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in determining the limit of [school administrators’] authority.” (quoting Thomas v. Bd.
of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring in
result))).
78. See id. at 50 (stating student, although posting online and off-campus,
knew and intended blog post to reach school). For further discussion of Wisniewski’s first reasonable foreseeability prong, see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying
text.
79. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50-52 (satisfying Wisniewski’s reasonable foreseeability test).
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school.80 Additionally, the court held schools may revoke the privilege of participation in extracurricular activities if the student violates an activity’s rules.81 The Doninger court concluded the
student’s First Amendment rights were not violated because her
speech was reasonably foreseeable to reach the school and cause a
substantial disruption within the school.82
2. All About Making Connections: Sufficient Nexus
Under the second approach, courts ask if the controversial
speech is “closely tied to the school” and uphold school authority to
regulate off-campus speech if it there is a sufficient nexus to a
school’s legitimate pedagogical concerns.83 In Kowalski, a student
had created a MySpace page alleging another student had a sexually transmitted disease.84 When the page came to their attention,
school officials declared the page a “hate website,” held that it violated the school’s harassment policy, and suspended the student
who created the page.85
Applying the sufficient nexus test, the Kowalski court asked
whether the speech concerned the school’s interest in “maintaining
80. See id. at 50-51 (noting blog post contained language that caused reasonably foreseeable disruption to school environment).
81. Id. at 52 (supporting school’s argument that extracurricular activities are
privileges subject to broader school disciplinary authority).
82. See id. at 50, 53 (concluding student’s speech was not protected by First
Amendment because it was reasonably foreseeable to reach school and cause substantial disruption). The Eighth Circuit has applied the reasonable foreseeability
test to off-campus racial harassment. See S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7
Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding blog was targeted at school
and would cause reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption). The Eighth Circuit upheld a school’s suspension of two students who created a blog containing
racist comments towards other students. Id. at 773-74 (noting blog posts contained
racist and sexist comments about other students). Because the court found the
blog to be directed at the school, it found the blog’s off-campus nature and content irrelevant. Id. at 778 (“The parties dispute the extent to which the Wilsons’
speech was ‘off-campus,’ but the location from which the Wilson’s spoke may be
less important than the District Court’s finding that the posts were directed at [the
school].” ). The Ninth Circuit applied the test in upholding a school’s suspension
of students who had sexually harassed another student in an off-campus park. See
C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding harassment satisfied reasonable foreseeability test because it was “so closely connected
to campus”).
83. See, e.g., C.R., 835 F.3d at 1150 (“Although the harassment at issue in this
case took place off school property, it was closely tied to the school.”); Kowalski v.
Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011) (justifying school’s punishment of student whose speech contained sufficient nexus to school’s pedagogical
interests).
84. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567-68 (highlighting content of student’s MySpace page).
85. Id. at 568-69 (noting school’s suspension decision based on school policy).
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order in the school and protecting the well-being and educational
rights of its children.”86 The court supported a school’s interest in
disciplining harassment or bullying in both Tinker and a Third Circuit case applying it.87 Classifying anti-bullying sentiment as having
a sufficient nexus to the school’s “pedagogical interest,” the Kowalski court upheld the school’s authority to regulate off-campus
speech.88
Other circuits have applied the nexus test.89 In Wynar, the
Ninth Circuit held a student’s off-campus harassment of other students, was nonetheless subject to school discipline because there
was a sufficient nexus to the school.90 Specifically, the Wyynar court
emphasized the harassment exclusively involved students from the
same school.91 However, Wynar tailored a school’s off-campus
speech regulation to “identifiable threat[s] of school violence.”92
In C.R., the Ninth Circuit applied the nexus test to off-campus
harassment and held a school may regulate such speech.93 The
Ninth Circuit found it especially relevant that only students were
involved and the incident occurred on a path leading to the school
minutes after school ended (though, still off school property).94
Additionally, the court stated the school may exercise “in loco parentis authority” to concern itself with “students’ well-being as they begin their homeward journey at the end of the school day.”95 The
86. Id. at 571 (framing issue of off-campus speech in terms of whether it affects school’s educational mission having satisfied reasonable foreseeability test).
87. See id. at 572 (citing DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 319-20 (3d
Cir. 2008)) (highlighting school’s interest with speech like bullying or harassment
impacting students in school).
88. Id. at 573 (stating bullying as related to school’s pedagogical interests subject to regulation).
89. See C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying nexus test to part of its reasoning); Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728
F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2013) (identifying nexus test as one of two viable offcampus speech tests).
90. See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069 (finding direct nexus to school).
91. See id. (finding participation of same school’s students having direct nexus
to school).
92. Id. (holding schools may discipline off-campus student speech that threatens school violence).
93. See C.R., 835 F.3d at 1150-51 (finding sufficient nexus to school). For further discussion of facts of C.R. and its use of reasonable foreseeability test, see
supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
94. See C.R., 835 F.3d at 1150-51 (noting specific factual factors tending to
show nexus to school environment).
95. Id. at 1151 (citing Veronica Sch. Dist. 47J v. Action, 515 U.S. 646, 654-56
(1995); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986)) (listing relevant factors in finding nexus to school). But see Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043,
1051 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting school’s in loco parentis authority over students after
school hours).
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C.R. court upheld the school’s authority to regulate such off-campus harassment.96
3. Tough Call: Tinker Just Applies
Other circuit courts have not utilized either of the aforementioned tests, applying Tinker to off-campus speech without any specific test.97 In Bell, the Fifth Circuit considered a First Amendment
challenge to a school’s disciplinary action against a student who
composed, published, and distributed rap video alleging sexual harassment by two coaches at the school.98 School officials took disciplinary action against the student when they discovered the video
referenced shooting both coaches.99 The Fifth Circuit determined
the case presented special facts and circumstances that did not
clearly fit within any of the Supreme Court’s exceptions.100
The Bell court upheld the student’s suspension because of the
increased prevalence of school violence and school officials’ role in
protecting students and teachers from threats of violence.101 The
Fifth Circuit rejected the student’s argument that Tinker does not
apply to off-campus speech because Tinker does not place proper
weight on technological advances.102 The court also cited Fifth Circuit precedent that considered a speaker’s intent for their speech
to reach the school in applying Tinker to off-campus speech.103 Applying Tinker, the Fifth Circuit determined the student’s speech
96. See C.R., 835 F.3d at 1153, 1155 (affirming district court’s grant of school’s
motion for summary judgment).
97. See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2015)
(en banc) (assuming, without deciding, Tinker applies to off-campus speech). For
further discussion of circuits applying Tinker to off-campus speech without a particular test, see infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
98. See Bell, 799 F.3d at 383-84 (discussing student’s reason for producing rap
video).
99. See id. at 384-85 (noting video contained references to shooting coaches
and how coach found video and relayed it to school’s principal).
100. See id. at 391-92 (citing Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765,
771-72 n.2 (5th Cir. 2007)) (noting case did not fall neatly within Fraser, Kuhlmeier,
or Morse, but nonetheless believed Tinker applied to violent threats).
101. See id. at 393 (highlighting rise of school violence and school officials’
special role given these circumstances).
102. See id. (contending technological advances mooted student’s argument
that Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech).
103. See id. at 394-95 (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608,
611 (5th Cir. 2004)) (“A speaker’s intention that his speech reach the school community, buttressed by his actions in bringing about that consequence, supports
applying Tinker’s school-speech standard to that speech.”).
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constituted a substantial disruption, upholding the student’s
suspension.104
E. The Third Circuit’s Off-Campus Speech Caselaw
Amongst the many different approaches, the Third Circuit also
had its fair share of off-campus speech cases.105 In 2011, the full
Third Circuit twice rejected exercises of school authorities’ discipline against off-campus speech that included minimal school resources and relatively minor connection to the schools.106 Both
cases involved students creating a fake MySpace profile page, criticizing school officials with vulgar language.107 However, each case
contains specific facts that require individual explanations.108
In Layshock, a student created demeaning and offensive MySpace profiles and posted pictures negatively depicting their principal.109 The student created the “parody profile” while at his
“grandmother’s house during non-school hours” and copied and
pasted the principal’s picture into the profile from the school district’s website.110 Several students accessed the profile in school despite attempts to block the page from the school’s computers.111
When the school identified the profile’s author, the school district
found him guilty of several discipline code violations and sus104. See id. at 398 (classifying student’s speech as foreseeably causing substantial disruption within school and affirming school’s suspension of student).
105. See, e.g., J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc), cert denied, Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 565 U.S. 1156 (2012) (holding Tinker
inapplicable to off-campus speech); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
205, 216, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert denied sub nom. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist. v.
J.S., 565 U.S. 1156 (2012) (holding Tinker and Fraser inapplicable to off-campus
speech).
106. See, e.g., Layshock, 650 F.3d at 214-16 (holding mere fact speech was directed at school community not enough to permit school regulation or discipline).
107. See J.S., 650 F.3d at 920 (“The profile contained adult language and sexually explicit language.”); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207-08 (noting profile’s vulgar and
offensive content).
108. Compare Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207-09 (noting several students accessed
page on school computer and directly mentioned principal), with J.S., 650 F.3d at
920-21 (noting no school computer ever accessed page and page never explicitly
referenced principal). For further discussion surrounding facts of Layshock, see
infra notes 109-113 and accompanying text. For further discussion of J.S.’s factual
background, see infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
109. See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207-08 (explaining factual background).
110. See id. (highlighting only school resource student used was principal’s
picture on school district website).
111. See id. at 209 (detailing school’s investigation of profile’s origins and attempts to block profile from access within school).
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pended him.112 The district court granted summary judgment in
the student’s favor; the school district appealed.113
In J.S., two students created a MySpace profile about their principal, without explicitly referencing the principal or the school, and
included many sexually explicit references and the principal’s official school district photograph as the profile picture.114 The publicly available profile was later made available only to the students’
friends, and no computer in the school ever accessed the profile
and the profile only entered the school at the principal’s express
request.115 The district court granted the school district’s motion
for summary judgment after the principal suspended the student
for causing a substantial disruption in the school.116
The Third Circuit delivered its opinions on these cases on the
same day, affirmed the district court’s judgment as to whether the
school could regulate off-campus speech in Layshock, and reversed
in J.S..117 In Layshock, the court rejected the school’s argument that
the student established a sufficient nexus with the school when he
used the principal’s picture from the school district’s website.118
Similarly unsuccessful was the school district’s argument that it
could regulate off-campus speech aimed at the school and reasonably foreseeable to come to school officials’ attention.119
In J.S., the Third Circuit held Tinker did not allow the school to
punish the off-campus speech because the MySpace profile was “so
112. See id. at 209-10 (noting school suspended student for ten days, prohibited him from participating in extracurricular activities, and forbade him from participating in his graduation ceremony).
113. See id. at 210-11 (detailing lower court’s judgment).
114. See J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920-21 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The
profile contained crude content and vulgar language, ranging from nonsense and
juvenile humor to profanity and shameful personal attacks aimed at the principal
and his family.”).
115. See id. at 921 (noting student changed profile accessibility after several
students complimented profile and referencing principal’s request for another student to bring printout of profile into school).
116. See id. at 921-23 (explaining district court’s decision that off-campus
speech fell under hybrid of Fraser and Morse).
117. See J.S., 650 F.3d at 933-36 (reversing district court’s grant of summary
judgment for school district but affirming court’s summary judgment for school
district on overbreadth claims); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219 (affirming summary judgment for student).
118. See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 214-16 (holding First Amendment prohibits
school from “stretching its authority into Justin’s grandmother’s home and reaching Justin while he is sitting at her computer after school hours”); id. at 214 (noting school district did not contest lack of substantial disruption under Tinker).
119. See id. at 216-19 (rejecting school district’s use of three cases allowing
schools to regulate off-campus speech because each case involved speech that
caused substantial disruption).
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ridiculous” it could not have caused a substantial disruption and
the student “did not even intend for the speech to reach the
school.”120 Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that Fraser justifies punishing the students for their vulgar off-campus
speech because students are afforded the same constitutional rights
as adults outside the school context.121 In both cases, the Third
Circuit expressly held Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech
and Tinker, as always, prohibits regulating off-campus speech that
does not substantially create a reasonably foreseeable disruption.122
Furthermore, the Third Circuit explained Tinker does not apply
solely to political speech.123 To the contrary, Kuhlmeier allows
schools to regulate speech a reasonable observer would perceive as
“the school’s own speech,” and Supreme Court precedent demonstrates Tinker is a general rule “subject to several narrow exceptions.”124 The Third Circuit also highlighted Alito’s Morse
concurrence where he advocated against a broad application of student speech caselaw to regulate any speech that may interfere with
a school’s “educational mission” whatsoever.125

120. J.S., 650 F.3d at 928-31 (holding Tinker did not apply because there was
no substantial disruption or sufficient nexus to school).
121. See id. at 932-33 (“The School District’s argument fails at the outset because Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech. Specifically in Morse, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, emphasized ‘[h]ad Fraser delivered the same
speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected.’”); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (citing Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)) (relying upon idea that state government may
not punish vulgar speech in public forum).
122. See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 214, 219 (reciting Tinker’s holding and holding
Fraser does not apply to off-campus speech); J.S., 650 F.3d at 926 (assuming Tinker
applied and finding no substantial or material disruption); see also J.S., 650 F.3d at
933 (“Under this standard, two students can be punished for using a vulgar remark
to speak about their teacher at a private party, if another student overhears the
remark, reports it to the school authorities, and the school authorities find the
remark ‘offensive.’”).
123. See J.S., 650 F.3d at 929-30 (holding less sensitive topics than opposing
Vietnam War during school hours still entitled to First Amendment protection).
124. Id. at 933 (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211-12,
215-17 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Since Tinker, the Supreme Court has carved out a number
of narrow categories of speech that a school may restrict even without the threat of
substantial disruption.”)).
125. Id. at 927 (quoting Morse, 551 U.S. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring)) (cautioning expansion of Supreme Court precedent to include flexible standard of
speech regulation).
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The Mahanoy Area School District is located in Schuylkill
County, Pennsylvania in Mahanoy City.126 Betty Lou (“B.L.”) was a
freshman when she made and joined the junior varsity cheerleading squad.127 Before B.L. tried out in May for next school year’s
cheerleading squad, she was required to read, sign, and abide by
the “Cheerleading Rules.”128 The “Cheerleading Rules” prohibited
“foul language and inappropriate gestures,” as well as “negative information regarding cheerleading, cheerleaders, or coaching
placed on the Internet.”129
B.L. tried out again for next year’s varsity squad and, much to
her chagrin, made the junior varsity squad again.130 Frustrated, she
took a “selfie” of her raising her middle finger alongside a friend at
a local store outside of the high school’s campus.131 B.L. captioned
the Snap with “f*** school f*** softball f*** cheer f*** everything”
and posted it to her private account where around two-hundred
fifty of her Snapchat friends could have seen the Snap.132 A fellow
cheerleader brought the Snap to the coaches’ attention.133 Believing the Snaps were inappropriate, non-cheerleading students at
B.L.’s school also brought the Snap to the coaches’ attention.134
126. See B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 432 (M.D. Pa.
2017) [hereinafter Mahanoy II] (describing school district’s location).
127. See id. (stating B.L. tried out for cheer squad after joining high school as
freshman).
128. See id. (“Coaches [Nicole] Luchetta-Rump and [April] Gnoll adopted
these Rules from their predecessor and did not need the District’s permission to
adopt or enforce them.”).
129. Id. (“These rules—the ‘Cheerleading Rules’ or ‘Rules’—state: ‘Please
have respect for your school, coaches, teachers, other cheerleaders and teams. Remember you are representing your school when at games, fundraisers, and other
events. Good sportsmanship will be enforced, this includes foul language and inappropriate gestures.’” (citation omitted)).
130. See B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 289 F. Supp. 3d 607, 610 (M.D. Pa.
2017) [hereinafter Mahanoy I] (describing how B.L. had been involved in cheerleading since fifth grade and helped fundraise for cheerleading program); see also
Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 175 (“To add insult to injury, an incoming freshman made
the varsity team.”).
131. Mahanoy II, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 433 (describing Snapchat as application
that allows users to send temporary texts, pictures, or videos to others and noting
B.L. was wearing street clothes in Snap).
132. See id. (expletives omitted) (noting many of B.L.’s Snapchat friends were
fellow cheerleaders at her high school and B.L. posted another non-profane Snap
expressing frustration shortly after first Snap).
133. See id. (noting coaches’ daughter took screenshot of B.L.’s Snap to report it to coaches).
134. See id. (“Several students, ‘both cheerleaders and non-cheerleaders[,]
approached Coach Luchetta-Rump to express their concerns that the Snaps were
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The coaches suspended B.L. from the team for a year for violating
the team’s rules.135
B.L.’s father appealed the coaches’ decision to the school
board who ultimately declined to get involved.136 B.L. filed suit in
district court seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the school district.137 The district court
granted B.L.’s preliminary injunction motion.138 The school district and B.L. both moved for summary judgment.139 B.L. advanced
several claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, specifically that the
coaches violated B.L.’s First Amendment rights when they suspended her from the team, the “Cheerleading Rules” were overbroad and viewpoint-discriminatory, and the “Cheerleading Rules”
were unconstitutionally vague.140
The district court held B.L. had not waived her First Amendment rights by agreeing to the team’s rules “and that her suspension from the team implicated the First Amendment even though
extracurricular participation is merely a privilege.”141 The district
court also concluded Tinker and Morse did not apply because B.L.’s
speech was off-campus speech and “had not caused any actual or
foreseeable substantial disruption of the school environment.”142
inappropriate. . . . [S]tudents were visibly upset and voiced their concerns to
[Coach] Luchetta-Rump repeatedly for several days.’”). For further discussion of
how B.L.‘s Snap did not cause substantial disruption and factual distinctions from
cases where other circuits found substantial disruption, see infra notes 248-262 and
accompanying text.
135. Mahanoy II, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 433 (noting coaches would not have suspended B.L. had she not referenced cheerleading program).
136. See id. (indicating school board’s refusal to get involved).
137. See id. (showing B.L.’s parents filed suit in District Court for Middle District of Pennsylvania seeking injunctive and declaratory relief).
138. See id. (“[Judge Caputo] issued the [temporary restraining order] pending resolution of the preliminary injunction. . . . [A]fter holding a hearing, [Judge
Caputo] issued a preliminary injunction, finding that, among other things, B.L.
was likely to succeed on the motions.”).
139. See id. (noting school district responded to B.L.’s complaint, each party
engaged in discovery, and both parties filed summary judgment motions).
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871) (“Every person who, under color of any statute . . . or usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.”); see also Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d 170, 176 (3d
Cir. 2020) (restating B.L.’s arguments before district court).
141. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 176 (recounting district court’s holding).
142. See id. (noting district court’s rejection of school district’s arguments relying on two Supreme Court school speech cases to justify B.L.’s suspension); see
also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding school may
prohibit use of on-campus vulgar or offensive student speech); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding schools may lawfully
regulate speech that materially and substantially interferes with school’s discipli-
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Ultimately, the district court determined the school district violated
B.L.’s First Amendment rights by disciplining her off-campus
speech and required the school to expunge her disciplinary record.143 The school district appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.144 The Third Circuit affirmed the district
court in holding B.L.’s speech was protected speech and she had
not waived her First Amendment rights by agreeing to abide by the
team’s rules.145
IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT STEPS UP

TO THE

PLATE (AGAIN)

Circuit Judge Krause, writing for the panel, started by identifying a “vital distinction” impacting students’ free speech rights: oncampus and off-campus speech.146 The Third Circuit discussed
how schools have felt emboldened to regulate online student
speech with the concomitant rise of social media.147 The Court
narrowed the plethora of issues presented on appeal down to
whether B.L.’s Snap was protected speech, and, if so, whether B.L.
waived her free speech rights.148
A. B.L. Engaged in Off-Campus Speech
First, the Third Circuit surveyed relevant student speech
caselaw, analyzed whether B.L.’s speech was on- or off-campus, and
decided whether the school district was justified in punishing
nary mission). For further discussion of Tinker and Fraser, see supra notes 25-39
and accompanying text.
143. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 176 (noting district court’s decision to not
consider B.L.’s other claims because her First Amendment rights were not
violated).
144. See id. (noting school district appealed to Third Circuit following judgment in B.L.’s favor).
145. See id. (explaining Third Circuit’s judgment).
146. See id. at 175 (“We ‘defer to the school[ ]’ when its ‘arm of authority does
not reach beyond the schoolhouse gate,’ but when it reaches beyond that gate, it
‘must answer to the same constitutional commands that bind all other institutions
of government.’” (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044-45 (2d Cir.
1979))).
147. See id. at 175, 179 (acknowledging technological revolution complicates
distinguishing between on- and off-campus speech and opining on school officials’
increased desires for regulatory expansion); see also Harriet A. Hader, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public School Jurisdiction Over Students’ Online
Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 1563 (2009) (highlighting school’s decision to punish student for using blog, exclusively at home, to criticize school’s administrators).
148. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 176 (“The briefs here are a testament to that
complexity [of First Amendment jurisprudence], citing a wealth of cases involving
not only student speech, but also public employee speech, obscenity, indecency,
and many other doctrines.”). For further discussion of protected speech and
waiver issues, see infra notes 204-207 and accompanying text.
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B.L.149 The Third Circuit proceeded to distinguish its approach
from other circuit courts’ approaches.150 Finally, the Mahanoy III
court decided whether B.L. waived her free speech rights by agreeing to the team’s rules.151 The Third Circuit vindicated studentathlete free speech rights, holding schools may not regulate offcampus speech that does not bear a school’s imprimatur, use
school resources, or involve school supervision and agreeing to
vague rules do not constitute waivers of First Amendment rights.152
The Third Circuit began by explaining students’ free speech
rights exist in much more than just the classroom.153 The Third
Circuit explicitly recognized these rights were limited and schools
may regulate substantially disruptive speech under Tinker.154 The
court notes where Tinker applies schools must either specifically
identify a potential disruption, or “answer to the same constitutional commands that bind all other institutions of government.”155
The majority concluded its overview of student speech rights by explaining the post-Tinker trilogy’s holdings before finding that students’ free speech rights are “coextensive with adults outside of
these limited exceptions.”156
149. Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 177 (explaining court’s method of analysis for
first issue of whether B.L.’s Snap was protected speech).
150. See id. at 186-91 (outlining other circuits’ approaches, issues with those
approaches, and why this court’s approach is most appropriate). For further discussion of other circuits’ approaches and the Third Circuit’s reasoning, see infra
notes 185-203 and accompanying text.
151. Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 192-94 (holding B.L. did not waive her First
Amendment rights because her conduct was outside of team rules’ scope). For
further discussion of whether B.L. waived her free speech rights by agreeing to
team rules, see infra notes 204-207 and accompanying text.
152. Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 189 (explaining why Third Circuit did not apply
Tinker to off-campus speech).
153. See id. (“[Students’ free speech rights] extend to all aspects of ‘the process of attending school,’ whether ‘in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on
the campus during authorized hours.’” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969))).
154. See id. (arguing schools’ educational mission accords school authorities
with some latitude to regulate speech that would “substantially and materially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school” (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509)).
155. See id. at 178 (“Where Tinker applies, a school may prohibit student
speech only by showing ‘a specific and significant fear of disruption.’”) (quoting
J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
156. Id. at 178 (quoting J.S., 650 F.3d at 932) (stating Bill of Rights provides
students with same protections as adults outside school context); see also id. “In
each of three later cases [Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse], the Court identified a limited area in which schools have leeway to regulate student speech without meeting
Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.”). For further discussion of post-Tinker
trilogy, see supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
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The Third Circuit argued while a school’s authority may reach
beyond the school building, it may not extend into students’
homes.157 The court identified the important challenge of demarcating a school’s boundaries to determine where a school’s authority to regulate student speech ends.158 The Third Circuit
reaffirmed courts must apply traditional free speech analyses in
light of the Internet’s “vast democratic forums.”159 The court believed it had to establish a clear test for Tinker’s applicability to offcampus speech.160 The B.L. panel stated that speech does not become on-campus speech solely because it reached the school’s attention, nor does speech that mentions the school establish a
sufficient nexus with the school.161 Therefore, B.L.’s speech was
off-campus.162

157. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 178 (noting physical building limitation view
fails to recognize extent of schools’ educational mission but no-limits view would
seriously diminish students’ free speech rights).
158. See id. at 179 (“[T]he Supreme Court, on defining the scope of schools’
authority, has consistently focused on the extent to which schools control or sponsor the forum or the speech.”); id. at 180 (noting court’s difficult task in carefully
delineating workable standard identifying school’s regulatory boundaries especially during digital revolution).
159. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 180 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
868 (1997)) (“In applying the First Amendment to this technology, the Court was
careful not to discard existing doctrines. . . . [T]he lesson from Reno and Packingham is that faced with new technologies, we must carefully adjust and apply—
not discard—our existing precedent.”).
160. See id. (recognizing difficult, but necessary, task of identifying boundary
between on- and off-campus speech to address student concerns in light of social
media’s pervasiveness).
161. See id. (“J.S. and Layshock yield the insight that a student’s online speech
is not rendered ‘on campus’ simply because it involves the school, mentions teachers or administrators, is shared with or accessible to students, or reaches the school
environment.”); see also J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (“[T]he fact that another student printed J.S.’s [MySpace] profile [making fun of the school’s principal] and brought it to school at the express request of
[the principal] does not turn J.S.’s off-campus speech into on-campus speech.”);
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding student’s use of school principal’s photograph from school district’s website in fake
MySpace profile shown as belonging to principal was not enough to transform his
speech into on-campus speech). But see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (finding schools may regulate student speech others might
reasonably perceive as bearing school’s imprimatur); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986) (holding schools may regulate student vulgarity
and lewdness if done in school-sponsored forum).
162. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 180-81 (resolving threshold issue by holding
B.L.’s speech took place off-campus).
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B. The School’s Punishment Violated B.L.’s First Amendment
Rights
After classifying B.L.’s speech as off-campus, the Third Circuit
then considered, and summarily rejected, the school district’s two
arguments justifying B.L.’s punishment.163 The school district first
argued Fraser and other First Amendment precedence justified its
decision to punish B.L.164 Next, the school district argued Tinker
justified its decision.165
1. Fraser and Other First Amendment Doctrines Did Not Justify B.L.’s
Punishment
The school district argued Fraser permits schools to prohibit
“vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive speech in order to
promote student civility.166 The school district further argued Fraser permits schools to regulate speech when it involves an extracurricular activity, regardless of whether B.L.’s speech was on- or offcampus.167 However, the court rejected the school district’s novel
argument that Fraser extends to extracurricular-related speech because its precedent limits a school’s ability to regulate vulgar or obscene student speech to only on-campus speech.168
The Third Circuit also found the balancing tests intrinsic in
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analyses incompatible to the
First Amendment’s strictures.169 Furthermore, the government’s
163. See id. at 181-86 (“We next ask whether the First Amendment allowed the
School District to punish B.L. for her off-campus speech.”).
164. See id. at 181 (identifying school district’s first argument based on Fraser).
For further discussion of Third Circuit’s rejection of Fraser argument, see infra
notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
165. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 181 (identifying school district’s second argument based on Tinker). For further discussion of Third Circuit’s rejection of Tinker
argument, see infra notes 176-184 and accompanying text.
166. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 180-81 (“Under Fraser, such speech ‘receives
no First Amendment . . . protection in school.’” (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area
Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 213 (3d Cir. 2001))).
167. See id. (arguing Fraser should be applied to extracurricular activities); see
also Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., FACEBOOK (Mar. 25, 2019, 2:15 PM) https://
www.facebook.com/MahanoyAreaSchoolDistrict/posts/2344545778930110
[https://perma.cc/84MF-GUJR] (“The basic premise is simple, extra-curricular activates [sic] are privileges to be earned rather than rights to be guaranteed.”).
168. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 181 (“To prevail under Fraser, therefore, the
School District must explain why J.S. and Layshock do not supply the decision as
rule [limiting Fraser to on-campus speech] . . . [W]e are unpersuaded.”); id. (noting Third Circuit’s previous citation to Second Circuit opinion implying less First
Amendment protection to students engaged in extracurriculars did not suggest
agreement with Second Circuit’s holding).
169. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 182 (“The First Amendment, however, abhors ‘ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.’” (citing United States
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interest in suppressing speech related to extracurricular activities
did not outweigh students’ free speech rights.170 The court also
rejected the school district’s argument that team members must
comply with the coaches’ demands unless their speech involved
matters of public concern.171 The school district’s argument that
speech directed towards minors was entitled to less First Amendment protection also failed.172 Finally, the panel emphasized its unwavering reliance on J.S. and Layshock in maintaining Fraser only
applies to on-campus speech, whether or not extracurricular activities are involved.173 The Third Circuit noted any form of school
discipline for student expression implicates the First Amendment.174 Overall, Fraser did not permit the school to discipline B.L.
for her off-campus speech.175
2. Tinker Did Not Justify B.L.’s Punishment
Failing to convince the Court Fraser applied, the school district
argued Tinker authorized the school to punish B.L. because B.L.’s
v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010))); id. (holding Fourth Amendment analyses
inapplicable and incompatible with First Amendment analyses); see also Josh
Blackman, The First Amendment and Balancing Tests, http://joshblackman.com/
blog/2010/04/20/the-first-amendment-and-balancing-tests/ [https://perma.cc/
LRA8-7QXQ] (Apr. 20, 2010) (explaining Stevens rejected government’s contention First Amendment requires weighing of social costs and benefits).
170. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 182 (holding due process weighing test inapplicable to First Amendment analysis even when involving so-called privilege of
extracurricular participation); see also Br. of Amicus Curiae Found. for Indiv.
Rights in Educ., Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d 170, at 11-12 (Aug. 28, 2019), (arguing
Fourteenth Amendment analysis is incompatible with First Amendment claims).
171. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 182-83 (rejecting public concern exception,
typically applied to government employees, for student speech cases); id. at 183
(“[S]tudents’ free speech rights are not limited to matters of public concern.”); see
also David L. Hudson Jr., Public Employees, Private Speech: 1st Amendment Doesn’t Always Protect Government Workers, AM. BAR ASS’N. J. (May 1, 2017), https://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/public_employees_private_speech
[https://perma.cc/3N8K-ES7Y] (explaining matters of public concern only applies to employees who speak not on private grievances, but on matters important
for public at-large).
172. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 192 (rejecting school district’s argument relying on sui generis case of vulgar content on radio station “uniquely accessible to
children.” (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978))).
173. See id. at 182-83 (“What was ‘unseemly and dangerous’ about the efforts
to apply Fraser to off-campus speech was not the punishments the students received, but that those punishments were used to ‘control’ students’ free expression
in an area traditionally beyond regulation.”) (quoting Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2010)).
174. See id. at 183 (“Thus, whatever the school’s preferred mode of discipline,
it implicates the First Amendment so long as it comes in response to the student’s
exercise of free speech rights.”).
175. See id. (concluding Fraser did not authorize B.L.’s punishment for offcampus speech).
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speech would have substantially disrupted the school’s cheerleading program.176 Reaffirming B.L.’s Snap was off-campus, the court
had to determine whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech.177
The Third Circuit had previously avoided addressing this issue, deciding student speech cases by referencing Fraser or “assum[ing],
without deciding” Tinker’s applicability to off-campus speech.178
The Mahanoy III court justified delineating Tinker’s applicability to off-campus speech with three reasons.179 First, the court concluded the traditional norm of avoiding constitutional issues where
possible was not feasible in this particular instance.180 Second, the
Mahanoy III court highlighted social media’s ever-expanding confusion among circuit and district courts.181 The panel felt it was necessary to affirmatively decide the issue because “no dominant
approach has developed” and district courts have grown increasingly frustrated with lacking guidance.182 Third, the court believed
remaining neutral on the issue would exacerbate uncertainties re176. See id. (“The School District falls back on Tinker, arguing that B.L.’s snap
was likely to substantially disrupt the cheerleading program.”).
177. See id. (“We therefore confront the question whether Tinker applies to
off-campus speech.”).
178. See id. at 183-84 (quoting J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d
Cir. 2011)) (noting J.S. court had assumed so because it found school had not
shown substantial disruption); see also Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216 (holding Fraser inapplicable to off-campus student speech). For further discussion of J.S. and
Layshock, see supra notes 105-125 and accompanying text
179. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 184 (justifying its decision to decide on
Tinker’s applicability to off-campus speech for three reasons).
180. See id. (resolving issue without deciding whether Tinker’s applicability
would leave several important questions unanswered for students engaged in extracurricular activities); see also Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 905
F.3d 208, 222, n.11 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Indeed, the entire purpose of the canon [of
constitutional avoidance] is to avoid reaching the merits of the constitutional issue.” (citing Santana Prods., Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc. 401 F.3d 123,
130-31 (3d Cir. 2005))); FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009)
(“The so-called canon of constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool, counseling that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional
doubts.”).
181. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 185 (opining recent circuit court decisions
have still not taken proper account of social media expansion and district courts
have no dominant test to rely on, frustrating some courts’ off-campus student
speech cases); see also Dunkley v. Bd. of Educ., 216 F. Supp. 3d 485, 492-93 (D. N.J.
2016) (rejecting applicability of Third Circuit precedent to off-campus student
speech case and applying Fourth Circuit precedent instead).
182. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 185 (“All the while, we have relegated district
courts in this Circuit to confronting this issue without clear guidance, prompting
them to turn elsewhere for support . . . and to voice their growing frustration. . . .
[A]s one of our district judges put it, ‘a district court in this Circuit takes up a
student off-campus speech case for review with considerable apprehension and
anxiety.’”) (quoting R.L. ex rel. Lordan v. Cent. York Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 3d
625, 635 (M.D. Pa. 2016)).
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garding boundaries of student speech which would ultimately chill
student speech altogether.183 For these three reasons, the Third
Circuit concluded Tinker did not apply to off-campus speech, analyzing other circuit courts’ approaches and explaining their preferred method.184
C. Critiquing Other Circuit’s Approaches
The Third Circuit identified and summarily scrutinized the
three different approaches.185 First, the Mahanoy III court underscored the extraordinary circumstances under which the leading
reasonable foreseeability case was decided and its wide-ranging application to harassment.186 Next, the court identified the “sufficient nexus” test as an impermissibly sweeping, policy-based
argument regarding a school’s educational mission to prevent harassment.187 Finally, the court pointed out a series of decisions in
which no definitive test was created for Tinker’s applicability for offcampus student speech as unhelpful.188
Although the Third Circuit expressed admiration for addressing the increasing prevalence of off-campus student speech cases, it
183. See id. (“Finally, while legal uncertainty of any kind is undesirable, uncertainty in this context creates unique problems. Obscure lines between permissible
and impermissible speech have an independent chilling effect on speech.” (citation omitted)); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535, U.S. 234, 244 (2002) (“The Constitution gives significant protection from overbroad laws that chill speech with the
First Amendment’s vast and privileged sphere.”).
184. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 185 (“The time has come for us to answer the
question. We begin by canvassing the decisions of our sister circuits. We then consider the wisdom of their various approaches, tested against Tinker’s precepts. Finally, we adopt and explain our own, concluding that Tinker does not apply to offcampus speech and reserving for another day the First Amendment implications of
off-campus student speech that threatens violence or harasses others.”).
185. See id. at 186-87 (describing reasonable foreseeability, sufficient nexus,
and application of Tinker without particular standard or test). For further discussion of other circuits’ approaches, see supra notes 63-104 and accompanying text.
186. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 186 (citing Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v.
Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35-39 (2d Cir. 2007)) (explaining how student created
image of teacher with pistol shooting bullet through teacher’s head and how it was
reasonably foreseeable for image to reach school authorities and cause substantial
disruption under Tinker); see also Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir.
2008) (relying on Wisniewski in concluding blog post urging students to harass
principal constituted substantial disruption).
187. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 186 (citing Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs.,
652 F.3d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 2011)) (noting Kowalski justified its decision based on
school’s supposed mission to prevent harassment and bullying).
188. See id. at 186-87 (citing Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 394
(5th Cir. 2015); Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Bd., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.
2013)) (explaining those decisions explicitly refused to develop specific rule to
determine whether Tinker covers off-campus speech but nonetheless upheld school
punishment of off-campus speech under Tinker).
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found the other circuit courts’ decisions “unsatisfying in three respects.”189 First, courts applying the reasonable foreseeability standard have done so reflexively without considering the specific facts
that justified the standard.190 Second, other circuits’ approaches
were impermissibly overbroad and dangerous to students’ free
speech rights, especially in light of social media.191 Third, the court
begrudged the great confusion the disparate approaches to offcampus speech has caused for students, teachers, and administrators alike.192 Overall, other circuits’ approaches “sweep in too
much speech and distort Tinker’s narrow exception into a vast font
of regulatory authority.”193
D. Home Run: The Third Circuit’s Approach
The Third Circuit set out why its approach was not only necessary, but far more clear-cut than other inadequate, confusing, and
impermissibly broad approaches.194 The court held “Tinker does
not apply to off-campus speech—that is, speech outside school189. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 187 (sympathizing with other circuits’ decisions but being ultimately unsatisfied by scope of their holdings).
190. See id. (criticizing courts for applying rules from factually distinct patterns to dissimilar, nonviolent contexts).
191. See id. (arguing other courts’ approaches delegated too much authority
to school officials to regulate student speech and opining on pre-social media age
where off-campus speech rarely would reach school authorities and, therefore, not
cause reasonably foreseeable disruption); id. at 188 (citing Kowalski v. Berkeley
Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011)) (expressing concern that schools may
manipulate sufficient nexus test to sweep any off-campus speech into its regulatory
jurisdiction and blur Tinker’s key focus on school context); see also Katherine A.
Ferry, Comment, Reviewing the Impact of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of “Social
Media” as Applied to Off-Campus Student Speech, 49 LOY. U. CHIC. L.J. 717, 751-54
(2018) (highlighting overbreadth and discretionary abuse by school officials as
most prevalent concerns with reasonable foreseeability test).
192. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 188 (“Third, other circuits’ approaches have
failed to provide clarity and predictability. This is true for those that have declined
to adopt a rule . . . leaving ‘students, teachers, and school administrators’ without
‘clear guidance.’”) (quoting Longoria v. San Benito Indep. Consol. Sch. Dist., 942
F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 2019)); id. (emphasizing other circuits’ approaches made it
difficult for students to predict whether their speech was protected, arguing students exercise minimal control over their information’s destination when it is relayed over social media).
193. Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 188-89 (noting court’s disapproval of other circuit courts’ approaches because they regulate far more speech than permissible).
194. See id. at 187, 189 (opining on commendable, yet unsatisfactory, efforts
of other circuits and court’s decision to “forge [its] own path”); see also Sarah A.
Gober, Third Circuit Clarifies Free Speech Rights of Public School Students, SCARINCI HOLLENBECK (Sept. 3, 2020), https://scarincilawyer.com/third-circuit-clarifies-freespeech-rights-of-public-school-students/ [https://perma.cc/8WLV-F77Q] (explaining how Third Circuit “clarified how existing precedent will be applied to
social media”).
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owned, -operated, or -supervised channels and not reasonably interpreted as bearing the school’s imprimatur.”195 The court believed
its holding was in line with Tinker, most adequately defended students’ free speech rights, and cleared the confusion the other circuits have caused.196
Furthermore, the B.L. Court found the use of social media inapposite to the type of speech delivered in Fraser; there is no captive
audience in the off-campus, social media realm.197 The Third Circuit also noted how speech like B.L.’s would not qualify under
Tinker if not posted online.198 Therefore, according to Reno and
Packingham, such online speech would also not qualify under
Tinker.199
The Third Circuit’s test is easily understood and applicable by
lower courts.200 The decision does not diminish a school’s disciplinary authority over on-campus speech that caused a substantial disruption.201 Schools can discipline some students’ reactions to offcampus speech, as long as that speech satisfies Tinker’s substantial
disruption standard or implicates other “sufficiently weighty inter195. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 189 (explaining Tinker’s applicability to student off-campus speech).
196. See id. (explaining students’ free speech rights mirroring those of citizens
in public contexts most fully comports with Tinker’s framework). Judge Ambro
concurred in affirming the district court’s judgment but believed the case could
have been decided via Third Circuit precedent without deciding a constitutional
question. See id. at 194, 196 (“Thus Tinker and its progeny, and our en banc decisions in Layshock and J.S. dictate that the School District violated B.L.’s First
Amendment rights. That is all we had to say.”). Ambro believed this decision will
create a circuit split, further confusing schools and lower courts. See id. at 197 (“I
fear that our decision will sow further confusion.”).
197. See id. (“Tinker’s focus on disruption makes sense when a student stands
in the school context, amid the ‘captive audience’ of his peers. . . . [B]ut it makes
little sense where the student stands outside that context, given that any effect on
the school environment will depend on others’ choices and reactions.” (quoting
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986))).
198. See id. (“The consensus in the analog era was that controversial off-campus speech was not subject to school regulation.” (citation omitted)); see also
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045, 1050-51 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding
school may not “punish[ ] students for expression that took place off school property” even when students sometimes wrote articles in school after hours “pasquinading school lunches, cheerleaders, classmates, and teachers . . . masturbation and
prostitution”).
199. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 189 (emphasizing rigid First Amendment
analyses despite technological advancement).
200. See id. at 189-90 (providing much-needed clarity for students, teachers,
and administrators).
201. See id. at 190 (“Nothing in this opinion questions school officials’ ‘comprehensive authority’ to regulate students when they act or speak within the school
environment.” (quoting J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir.
2011))).
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est[s].”202 Finally, the court justified its decision despite the natural
consequence that some offensive speech would be protected.203
E. B.L. Did Not Waive Her Free Speech Rights
The court explained that waivers of free speech rights “must be
voluntary, knowing . . . intelligent . . . [and] established by ‘clear’
and ‘compelling’ evidence” with a presumption against waiver.204
Addressing each of the school district’s and team’s rules in light of
these standards for waivers, the court concluded B.L.’s Snap “does
not clearly ‘fall within the scope’” of those rules.205 The court also
found the rules overly broad.206 Therefore, the court held B.L. had
not waived her free speech rights and, because Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech, affirmed the district court’s judgment.207
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: WHY

THE THIRD CIRCUIT HIT
SLAM

A

GRAND

The Third Circuit faithfully applied major principles from Supreme Court precedence in its decision and adhered to its own precedent.208 Additionally, the Third Circuit correctly held B.L.’s
Snap did not satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.209 Finally, because B.L.’s Snap did not cause a substantial disruption in
202. See id. at 190-91 (maintaining school may discipline student for reaction
to off-campus speech that causes substantial disruption within school environment
or for other heightened interests).
203. See id. at 191 (noting some unpleasant and vulgar speech will be shielded
from school regulation and discipline).
204. Id. at 192 (quoting Erie Telecomm., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084,
1094-95 (3d Cir. 1988)) (explaining free speech waiver requirements); see also id.
(declining to address district court’s unconstitutional conditions ruling where state
actor may not condition public benefit on constitutional violation).
205. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 192-93 (concluding neither school district’s
nor team’s rules apply to B.L.’s Snap and that respect rule does not cover events
outside of sports season); id. at 193 (finding school’s punishment based on B.L.’s
opinions rather than information about cheerleading program covered by negative information rule).
206. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 193-94 (“First, [the rule] applies only ‘during
the sports season. . . .’ [T]hat language is too obscure, and too dependent on the
whims of school officials, to give rise to a knowing and voluntary waiver of B.L.’s
rights to speak as she did.” (citation omitted)).
207. See id. at 194 (holding B.L. had not waived free speech rights and affirming district court’s judgment). For further discussion of district court’s holding, see supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
208. For further discussion of how Third Circuit faithfully and correctly applied Supreme Court precedent, see infra notes 211-233 and accompanying text.
For further discussion of how Third Circuit faithfully applied its own precedent,
see infra notes 234-240 and accompanying text.
209. For further discussion of Third Circuit’s hybrid rule, see infra notes 241247 and accompanying text.
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the school environment and her Snap did not implicate other concerns present in other circuits’ decisions, the Third Circuit correctly decided Mahanoy III regardless of whether Tinker applied to
off campus speech.210
A. The Third Circuit Faithfully Applied the Supreme Court’s
Student Speech Precedent
The Third Circuit, like other circuits, retraced the evolution of
Student speech rights and analyzed Tinker and the holding’s interaction with the post-Tinker trilogy.211 However, this was the only
similarity; the Third Circuit buttressed the other circuits’ approaches by reiterating Tinker and its progeny apply only to on-campus speech or other specific types of off-campus speech.212 In
doing so, not only did the Third Circuit create a rule fully incorporating Supreme Court precedent, but it also followed its own established precedent.213
1. The Supreme Court Limited School’s Regulatory Authority to Specific
Categories of Off-Campus Speech
The Third Circuit’s opinion stands out by fully incorporating
the Supreme Court’s applicable caselaw.214 Specifically, the Third
Circuit properly characterized the post-Tinker decisions as narrow,
context-specific exceptions to, as opposed to over-rulings of,
Tinker.215 The Third Circuit also properly emphasized the applicability of Tinker to on-campus speech only.216 Schools may only regu210. For further discussion of how Third Circuit correctly decided Mahanoy
III, even if Tinker applied to off-campus speech, see infra notes 248-262 and accompanying text.
211. See Wermiel, supra note 60, at 1137 (noting Supreme Court’s intention
and circuit courts’ application of starting every student speech case analysis with
Tinker); see also Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 178 (discussing Tinker exceptions).
212. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 178 (describing post-Tinker trilogy as narrow
exceptions to Tinker’s general rule).
213. For further discussion of how Third Circuit followed its own precedent,
see infra notes 234-240 and accompanying text.
214. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 178 (“[The Third Circuit’s] rule is true to the
spirit of Tinker, respects student rights, and provides much-needed clarity to students and officials alike.”).
215. See id. (stating Tinker was, and still is, narrow exception to school’s regulatory authority).
216. See id. (“Fraser could not have been disciplined had he ‘delivered the
same speech in a public forum outside the school context.’”) (quoting Frederick v.
Morse, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007)).
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late specific instances of off-campus speech so long as it fits within
any of the post-Tinker trilogy’s frameworks.217
As the Third Circuit pointed out, Tinker is the standard rule
and sets forth specific, limited student speech circumstances before
a school may discipline the student, suggesting a presumption in
favor of student speech.218 As Tinker affirmatively recognized, the
court has consistently recognized the existence of First Amendment
rights for public school students.219 Furthermore, the Tinker court
held a school must make a “specific showing of constitutionally
valid reasons” before regulating student speech.220
Some critics may argue Tinker’s “beyond the schoolhouse gate”
language endows schools with regulatory authority extending beyond the classroom and commanding judicial deference to
schools.221 However, the Supreme Court prefaced this language exclusively on student and teacher speech rights within the school environment and not on school authority’s reach.222 Thus, Tinker
holds students’ First Amendment rights follow them into the school
environment, not that school’s authority extends outside that
environment.223
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s student speech framework
determines whether speech is protected under Tinker or an exception applies. If Tinker does not apply, a school may only regulate
217. See id. at 190 (“The school can punish any disruptive speech or expressive conduct within the school context that meets Tinker’s standards—no matter
how that disruption was ‘provoke[d].’”).
218. See id. (noting Tinker’s role as baseline “narrow accommodation”); see also
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (placing
burden on school to show more than just “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint”).
219. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506-07 (citing string of cases in previous fifty years
standing for proposition that students and teachers do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate”).
220. See id. at 511 (suggesting school may not merely speculate or present
totally hypothetical situation to justify burden on student speech).
221. See Erwin Chemerinsky, What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 54546 (2000) (explaining how post-Tinker Supreme Court and district court decisions
echo Justice Black’s deference-based approach instead of Justice Fortas’s broad
constitutional rights approach).
222. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (“It can hardly be argued that either students
or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate.”); see also Daniel Marcus-Toll, Tinker Gone Viral: Diverging
Threshold Tests for Analyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital Student Speech, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 3395, 3436 (2014) (arguing students are entitled to full First
Amendment protections outside school context).
223. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (recognizing students and teachers’ First
Amendment rights do not diminish when entering school premises, though oncampus speech that causes substantial disruption may be regulated).
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student speech within the narrow circumstances of the post-Tinker
trilogy.224 Therefore, the Supreme Court delivered each of these
opinions without actually or intentionally eschewing Tinker and
viewed each exception as specifically delineated and limited.225 Accordingly, the Third Circuit explained the post-Tinker trilogy was an
exception to meeting the substantial disruption standard, allowing
schools to regulate only certain speech without undergoing a Tinker
analysis.226 Moreover, it is clear from Tinker and its progeny that
Tinker only applies to on-campus speech.227 Here, the Third Circuit
properly emphasized B.L.’s off-campus location when she sent her
224. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 178 (noting while “each of these [postTinker] cases added a wrinkle, none disturbed the basic framework on which Tinker
relied” and trilogy recognized “a limited area in which schools have leeway to regulate student speech without meeting Tinker’s substantial disruption standard”); see
also Wermiel, supra note 60, at 1137 (“The Supreme Court has made clear, and
virtually all lower courts accept the fact, that the starting point for analyzing any
student speech case is derived from Tinker.”).
225. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007) (citing Bethel Sch. Dist.
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 689 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring)) (noting Fraser applied different analysis than Tinker because public school administrators have interest in “ensur[ing] that a high school assembly proceeds in an orderly manner”).
226. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 178 (“In each of three later cases, the Court
identified a limited area in which schools have leeway to regulate student speech
without meeting Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.”).
227. See Steve Varel, Limits on School Disciplinary Authority over Online Student
Speech, 33 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 423, 427 (2013) (noting Supreme Court has never held
Tinker to apply to off-campus speech); see also Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 191 (“We
hold only that off-campus speech not implicating that class of interests lies beyond
the school’s regulatory authority.”); see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Student Free Speech
Case ‘Chipped Away’ at After 50 Years, But ‘Overall Idea’ Remains, AM. BAR ASS’N J.
(Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/50th-anniversary-oftinker-v-des-moines [https://perma.cc/B9RG-GA5S] (quoting Professor Emily
Gold Waldman who argues student speech controversies must fall under postTinker trilogy exception or else have to withstand Tinker); Emily Gold Waldman,
Regulating Student Speech: Suppression Versus Punishment, 85 IND. L.J. 1113, 1136
(2011) (stating school must either satisfy Tinker substantial disruption test or fall
within post-Tinker trilogy to regulate speech). A highly relevant and instructive
post-Tinker, pre-trilogy case is Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 180 (citing Thomas as standing for proposition that mere
mention of school, teacher, or administration does not transform speech into oncampus speech). There, the Second Circuit considered whether a school could
regulate an off-campus newspaper distributed to purposely avoid the school environment. See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050 (“That a few articles were transcribed on
school typewriters, and that the finished product was secretly and unobtrusively
stored in a teacher’s closet do not alter the facts that [the paper] was conceived,
executed, and distributed outside the school.”). The court explicitly recognized
Tinker applied only to on-campus speech and students are entitled to the same
First Amendment protections as adults “out of the school yard.” Id. at 1050-51
(stating school authority’s “reaching into the general community where the freedom accorded expression is at its zenith, their actions must be evaluated by the
principles that bind government officials in the public arena”). The Second Circuit also found it relevant all speech occurred outside school grounds. See id. at
1050 (“At best, therefore, any activity within the school itself was de minimis.”).
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friends the controversial private Snapchat story.228 A student who is
in their grandparent’s home is able to exercise their First Amendment rights without fear of repercussion.229 Thus, a school cannot
justify punishing student athletes for off-campus speech occurring
over the weekend.230
Furthermore, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse all explicitly reaffirm
the school context is most relevant in determining whether schools
may regulate or discipline student speech.231 The sum total of the
Supreme Court’s student speech caselaw applies to on-campus
speech that materially or substantially disrupts the school’s educational mission or falls under “carefully restricted circumstances”;
otherwise, a school may not regulate off-campus speech.232 There228. Compare Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 175, 180 (noting B.L.’s speech occurred
off-campus, without school resources, and outside school hours), with Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396-79 (2007) (describing student’s suspension in relation
to “school-sanctioned and school-sponsored” event occurring immediately outside
school building during school hours, in plain view of other students, and on camera); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
(citing Blackwell v. Issaquena Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1966))
(holding schools may only regulate speech on school property and citing Blackwell
case to justify “conduct by the student, in class or out of it” that causes substantial
disruption is not protected).
229. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (“[W]e do not think that the First Amendment can tolerate the School
District stretching its authority into [a student’s] grandmother’s home and reaching [the student] while he is sitting at her computer after school in order to punish him for the expressive conduct that he engaged in there.”).
230. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 190 (“[N]o one, including our [concurring]
colleague, has . . . suggested that a student who advocated a controversial position
on a placard in a public park one Saturday would be subject to school discipline.”).
231. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988) (stating Tinker analysis “addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises”) (emphasis added); Morse, 551
U.S. at 404 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1986)) (emphasizing student speech would have been protected “in a public forum outside the
school context”); see also J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (holding Supreme Court precedent confirms Fraser does not apply to
off-campus speech); Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (citing (Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685) (noting in Fraser, school could not punish sexually explicit speech outside school context); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (underscoring its holding applied “in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment”); Lee C. Baxter, The Unrealistic
Geographic Limitations of the Supreme Court’s School-Speech Precedents: Tinker in the Digital Age, 75 MONT. L. REV. 103, 116 (2014) (noting Third Circuit correctly held
Fraser applied only to on-campus speech).
232. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13 (clarifying students’ free speech rights extend
beyond classroom, but within school environment); see also Morse, 551 U.S. at 40506 (assuming schools may regulate speech only within its premises by acknowledging “the government could not censor similar speech outside the school” (quoting
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266)); Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266-68 (1988) (affirming
school’s authority to regulate contents of newspaper published as part of regular
classroom activities and reiterating Tinker’s applicability only to “expressing
[one’s] personal views on the school premises”); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (“The de-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021

33

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 4

402

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28: p. 369

fore, the Third Circuit correctly held the school district failed to
show a substantial disruption or post-Tinker exception applied to
discipline B.L. for her off-campus speech.233
2. Third Circuit Precedent Supports Holding Tinker Inapplicable to OffCampus Speech
The Third Circuit naturally extended its previous decisions in
J.S. and Layshock.234 Both cases assert schools do not possess the
authority to regulate speech occurring mostly off-campus with minimal school resources.235 Both also explicitly hold the Supreme
Court expressly limited Fraser to on-campus speech.236 Additionally, both cases note off-campus speech that mentions the school in
some way or reaches the school through friends does not transform
it into on-campus speech.237
Third Circuit precedent effectively commanded the result in
Mahanoy III.238 The facts of Mahanoy III reveal similarities to J.S.
and Layshock because B.L. was off-campus, outside of normal
termination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”) (emphasis added).
233. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 183, 185-86 (holding neither Fraser nor Tinker
justified B.L.’s off-campus speech punishment).
234. See J.S. v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 931 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding
school had not affirmatively shown material and substantial disruption); Layshock,
650 F.3d at 216 (holding school could not punish student for speech only slightly
connected to school resources).
235. See J.S., 650 F.3d at 932-33 (holding even though friends who saw controversial MySpace page were page creator’s schoolmates, speech was not directed to
school); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 215-19 (noting school may not regulate off-campus
speech after school hours to same extent as if speech occurred on campus).
236. See J.S., 650 F.3d at 932 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 405) (noting Supreme
Court explicitly rejected idea school could regulate speech outside school context); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216 (stating Fraser is limited to on-campus speech).
237. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (finding wearing black armbands could not
“reasonably . . . [lead] school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on
the school premises in fact occurred.”). But see Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 190 (“The
school can punish any disruptive speech or expressive conduct within the school
context that meets Tinker’s standards—no matter how that disruption was “provoke[d]. It is the off-campus statement itself that is not subject to Tinker’s narrow
recognition of school authority.”) (emphasis added); J.S., 650 F.3d at 933 (holding
student bringing printout of MySpace profile at principal’s request not enough to
transform off-campus speech into on-campus speech); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 217,
219 (emphasizing profile mentioned principal and reaching school and student
using school website to get principal’s official picture were not enough to justify
discipline or punish student).
238. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 180 (“J.S. and Layshock yield the insight that a
student’s off-campus speech is not rendered ‘on campus’ simply because it involves
the school, mentions teachers or administrators, is shared with or accessible to
students, or reaches the school environment.”).
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school hours, and mentioned the school’s cheerleading program
and she was punished only when one of her Snapchat friends
brought the Snap to the coaches’ attention.239 Mahanoy III shows
such factual similarity yields similar outcomes.240
3. Mahanoy III Fully Incorporates Supreme Court’s Framework
The Third Circuit laid out a clear, comprehensive, and workable standard that took the Supreme Court’s entire student speech
precedent into account.241 Mahanoy III invokes Tinker’s holding by
restricting school’s regulatory authority to on-campus speech.242
The Third Circuit incorporated Fraser by considering “captive audience” concerns arising from on-campus speech or at school-sponsored events.243 Furthermore, the Third Circuit evoked Kuhlmeier
by focusing on a school’s authority over speech reasonable observers would believe bears the school’s endorsement.244 Finally, Morse
respected schools’ heightened concern over on-campus speech
which school authorities reasonably perceive as promoting illegal
drug use.245 Mahanoy III weaved Morse’s reaffirmation of prohibit239. See id. at 175-76 (detailing facts surrounding controversy before Third
Circuit); see also J.S., 650 F.3d at 920 (noting student created profile at home on
weekend); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207 (noting student created profile off-campus
during non-school hours).
240. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 180-81 (highlighting too little contact between student and school for Snap to be on-campus).
241. For further discussion of how Third Circuit represented blending of Supreme Court precedent, see infra notes 242-247 and accompanying text.
242. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 189 (holding Tinker inapplicable to off-campus speech); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513-14 (1969) (citing Hammond v. S.C. Cmty. Coll., 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C.
1967)) (emphasizing impermissibility of regulating speech “anywhere on school
property”); Dickey v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ. (M.D. Ala. 1967)) (posing hypothetical where school prohibits all speech on Vietnam conflict “anywhere on school property except as part of a prescribed classroom exercise” would violate First
Amendment) (emphasis added).
243. Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 189 (focusing on substantial disruption is irrelevant where there are no concerns with school children being captive audience and
unable to turn ears away from speech and holding school may not regulate speech
outside “school-owned, -operated, or -supervised channels”); see also Bethel Sch.
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986) (noting heightened school authority to
regulate speech where captive audience includes minors).
244. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 189 (recounting Third Circuit’s rule that
school may not regulate speech “that is not reasonably interpreted as bearing the
school’s imprimatur”); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
271 (1988) (holding school may regulate student expression in “school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school”).
245. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (noting school may not
regulate or discipline speech in public forum outside school context).
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ing schools from regulating speech outside of the school context
into its opinion.246 Therefore, the Third Circuit faithfully applied
Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent in concluding Tinker
does not apply to off-campus speech.247
B. B.L.’s Snap Did Not Satisfy Tinker’s Substantial Disruption
Standard
Under Tinker and progeny, B.L.’s Snap did not cause a material or substantial disruption in the school environment.248 Additionally, the other appellate courts’ approaches involved threats of
violence or other such factual patterns reasonably likely to satisfy
Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.249 Therefore, the Third
Circuit correctly held neither Tinker nor the post-Tinker trilogy applied to B.L.’s off-campus speech.250
1. B.L.’s Snap Did Not Create Material or Substantial Disruption
B.L.’s Snap did not constitute a material or substantial disruption of the school environment.251 Some cheerleaders and other
schoolmates were merely concerned it was inappropriate.252 The
students who wore black armbands in Tinker created more of a disruption in the school than B.L. did, and the majority still held the
school had not met its burden of justifying its disciplinary actions.253 The Third Circuit also vindicated the rights of student athletes when it held the First Amendment does not protect athletes or
246. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 189 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 405) (emphasizing Tinker’s substantial disruption standard only addresses speech delivered oncampus that causes substantial disruption).
247. For further discussion of Supreme Court’s caselaw refuting Tinker’s applicability to off-campus speech, see supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
248. For further discussion of how B.L.’s Snap did not cause material or substantial disruption, see infra notes 251-255 and accompanying text.
249. For further discussion of how Mahanoy III’s facts differed from other circuit court cases, see infra notes 256-262 and accompanying text.
250. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 181-86 (holding Tinker and Fraser did not
justify school’s decision to punish B.L.).
251. See id. at 190 (holding Tinker inapplicable but affirming Tinker’s applicability to off-campus expressive activity that does cause substantial disruption in
school); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969) (outlining substantial disruption standard).
252. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 175-76 (noting only disruption B.L. caused
by her Snap was students bringing Snap to coaches’ attention).
253. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (highlighting record included instances of warnings
by other students and disruption to math class arising from one student’s wearing
of black armband). For further discussion of lack of substantial disruption, see
supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
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extracurricular-related speech any less vigorously than those uttered in the classroom.254 B.L.’s Snap clearly did not satisfy the substantial disruption standard and, therefore, even if Tinker or Fraser
applied to off-campus speech, the Third Circuit correctly held the
school violated B.L.’s First Amendment rights.255
2. Mahanoy III is Factually Distinct from Other Circuits’ Cases
Additionally, the Third Circuit properly distinguished this case
from those implicating threats of violence.256 Violent threats have a
tendency of causing a substantial disruption of the school environment.257 However, violent threats were notably absent from the record in Mahanoy III.258 Furthermore, the facts surrounding B.L.’s
Snap were distinguishable from any of the other circuits’ approaches involving violent threats.259 B.L.’s Snap also did not involve sexual or racial harassment.260 Even if off-campus harassment
of other students were enough to justify school discipline, off-campus social media posts venting frustrations like B.L.’s do not implicate such safety concerns and, thus, would be protected speech.261
Thus, Mahanoy III was correctly decided and stands as a landmark
254. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 181-82 (rejecting Fourth Amendment reasonableness and due process weighing tests arguments that students have reduced
First Amendment rights when participating in extracurricular activities).
255. See id. at 190 (stating source of disruption—whether on- or off-campus—
is irrelevant and only whether disruption occurred on-campus is relevant); id.
(opining that threats of violence might still justify disciplining students for offcampus speech in certain circumstances).
256. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 190-91 (distinguishing this case from others
involving violent threats and leaving question of Tinker’s applicability to such
threats for another time).
257. See Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 771 (5th Cir. 2007)
(stating teachers and administrators must take violent threats seriously due to increased prevalence of school shootings); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981,
987 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting rise of school shootings raises special concerns regarding teacher and student safety).
258. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 176 (detailing B.L.’s Snap).
259. Compare id. (outlining B.L.’s Snap expressing her frustration with cheerleading program), with Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064-65
(9th Cir. 2013) (describing student threats to shoot school amid evoking images of
Virginia Tech shooting), and Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494
F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007) (describing student’s creation of instant messaging icon
depicting bullet passing through teacher’s head).
260. See C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016) (involving
harassment in off-campus public park); S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7
Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012) (involving racist blog posts directed towards students).
261. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 191 (emphasizing its holding does not weigh
against Morse’s weighing of “sufficiently weighty interest” to “justify a narrow exception to students’ broader free speech rights”).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021

37

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 4

406

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28: p. 369

decision protecting student athlete rights even when participating
in activities considered by many to be a “privilege.”262
C. The Third Circuit Vindicates Student-Athlete Rights
The Third Circuit made clear student athletes do not sign away
their First Amendment off-campus speech rights to participate in
school sports.263 Many student free speech advocates regard the
Third Circuit’s decision as fully defending off-campus speech and
advocating a heavily contrarian position to the current norm of disciplining students for social media usage.264 These advocates contend that such a ruling provides a clear-cut rule that schools and
courts hearing related challenges may produce more predictable
outcomes.265 Others praise the decision as re-establishing fundamental Tinker principles: students do not walk into a constitutional
decontamination zone, even in the digital age.266
262. For further discussion of Third Circuit’s adherence to Supreme Court
and its own precedent, see supra notes 211-247 and accompanying text.
263. See Adam Goldstein, Students in Sports Keep Off-Campus Speech Rights, Third
Circuit Rules, FOUND. FOR INDIV. RIGHTS IN EDUC. (July 1, 2020), https://
www.thefire.org/students-in-sports-keep-off-campus-speech-rights-third-circuitrules [https://perma.cc/Z634-6FG3] (stating Third Circuit’s decision stands for
proposition that student athletes do not lose First Amendment rights even when
participating in extracurriculars usually deemed privilege).
264. See Theresa E. Loscalzo & Arleigh P. Helfer III, Third Circuit Expands First
Amendment Speech Protection for Students’ Off-Campus Speech, SCHNADER (July 1, 2020),
http://www.schnader.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ALERT-3rd-Circuit-Expands-First-Amendment-Speech-Protection-for-Students-Off-Campus-Speech-7-120-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ5Y-WXQ7] (“The Third Circuit affirmed . . . expressly holding for the first time that off-campus student speech was protected to
the full extent afforded by the First Amendment and not subject to the well-known
Tinker standard that applies to student speech in school.”); see also Corey Friedman,
Circuit Court Cheers Student Speech Rights, NOOZHAWK (July 15, 2020), https://
www.noozhawk.com/article/corey_friedman_circuit_court_cheers_student_speech_rights_20200715 [https://
perma.cc/V7D8-L6Y6] (“That’s a bona fide bombshell in the education world,
where snooping on students’ social media pages is a popular pastime.”).
265. See Cameren Boatner, Federal Appeals Court Ruling Affirms Students’ OffCampus First Amendment Rights, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (July 16, 2020), https://
splc.org/2020/07/federal-appeals-court-ruling-affirms-students-off-campus-firstamendment-rights/ [https://perma.cc/AF6J-GGA7] (noting ruling’s clarity actually helps school administrators for reducing liability for disciplining and benefits
courts with bright-line rule, and praising decision as pro-student speech victory));
see also Mark Walsh, Federal Appeals Court Rejects Student Discipline for Vulgar Off-Campus Message, ED. WEEK (July 1, 2020), https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/
school_law/2020/07/federal_appeals_court_rejects.html [https://perma.cc/
S3CJ-6KFH] (quoting Yale Law Professor Justin Driver’s contention that Third Circuit’s decision was strongly in favor of students’ rights and “lower courts—and educators—desperately need some guidance on this incredibly common question”).
266. See Adam Tragone, Third Circuit Broadens First Amendment Speech Protection
for Students’ Off-Campus Speech , https://www.smgglaw.com/blog/third-circuitbroadens-first-amendment-speech-protection-for-students-off-campus-speech
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As groundbreaking as Mahanoy III is for student-athlete speech
rights, the decision is not without its critics.267 Many proponents of
greater deference to school authorities advance the typical argument that extracurricular participation is a privilege outside the
school’s curriculum.268 They argue participating students are entitled to less First Amendment protections so schools may more properly discipline rule-breakers.269 Further, such proponents argue
schools may subject students participating in extracurricular activities to more regulations and intrusions than other students.270 Critics suggest that removal from extracurricular activities is
permissible as long as students’ ability to attend class remains intact.271 However, these criticisms do not specifically address First
Amendment implications of punishing off-campus student-athlete
speech, nor does the “privileged” nature of extracurricular participation establish a zone of reduced First Amendment protection.272
Indeed, given the special characteristics of the school environment,
students’ free speech rights are not “automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings.”273 However, as Mahanoy III
[https://perma.cc/N6KA-2YR6] (July 6, 2020) (“The [Mahanoy III] Court thus reaffirmed the long-held principle that ‘the schoolyard is not without boundaries
and the reach of school authorities is not without limits.’”).
267. See Br. of Amici Curiae Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’net al, Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist.
v. B.L., No. 20-255, at 12 (Oct. 1, 2020) (“[T]he Third Circuit’s strict on-campus,
off-campus distinction places school administrators in the untenable position of
being responsible for more and more student conduct while possessing less and
less leeway to maintain order and instill civility.”).
268. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., supra note 167 (quoting Dr. Lawrence Mussoline, educational expert, who believed “[s]chool related extracurricular activities
. . . are student privileges not mandated by statute . . . that could be removed for
much less reason than needed to suspend someone from the property right of
attending school itself”).
269. See Br. of Amici Curiae Nat’l Sch. Bds. Ass’net al, Mahanoy Area Sch.
Dist. v. B.L., No. 20-255, at 11-12 (Oct. 1, 2020) (arguing schools “must be able to
suitably discipline students who undermine rules and expectations” in order to
instill “a broader and more diffuse set of values than those implicated by classroom
learning”).
270. See id. at 12-13 (citing two cases suggesting students have less rights when
engaging in extracurricular activities).
271. See id. at 14-16 (suggesting nature of extracurricular-related punishment
differs from academic-related punishment and schools should have more flexibility
in addressing students who break extracurricular rules).
272. For further discussion of how Mahanoy III’s critics’ arguments regarding
diminished free speech rights when participating in extracurricular activities fall
short, see infra note 298-300 and accompanying text.
273. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (rejecting argument student free speech rights are automatically equivalent to adults in public
forum). But see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969) (underscoring importance of school’s mission to teach civility and maintain
discipline).
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explains, reduced constitutional protections have been upheld only
in the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process context.274
VI. HOW MAHANOY III IMPACTS

THE

REST

OF THE

GAME

The Third Circuit’s opinion profoundly impacts students’ free
speech rights within the Third Circuit and has the potential to protect student-athletes across the country.275 The Third Circuit delivered what both proponents and opponents of liberal student free
speech rights consider the “most expansive ruling on students’ offcampus speech rights in the country” and as a landmark ruling.276
Mahanoy III diverged from the growing trend in other federal appellate courts permitting school officials to discipline off-campus
speech so long as it is likely to cause a substantial or material disruption of the school environment.277 This decision may impact both
the legal framework of student speech, while encouraging and empowering student athletes to know and exercise their constitutional
rights whether it centers on criticizing the school or its sports program, or advances a social cause.278

274. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 192 (holding First Amendment abhors “ad
hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits” typical of reasonableness and
due process analyses).
275. For further discussion of impact of Mahanoy III, see infra notes 276-308
and accompanying text.
276. Federal Appeals Court Upholds and Expands Students’ Free Speech in Schuylkill
County Case, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF PA. (June 30, 2020), https://
www.aclupa.org/en/press-releases/federal-appeals-court-upholds-and-expands-students-free-speech-schuylkill-county-case [https://perma.cc/FV9D-MJ5H] (describing Mahanoy III as historic case and most expansive protection of off-campus
student speech). For further discussion of how Third Circuit’s opinion protects
more student speech than any other circuit, see supra notes 185-193 and accompanying text.
277. For further discussion of how Third Circuit’s decision differs from other
circuit approaches to Tinker’s applicability to off-campus speech, see supra notes
194-203 and accompanying text.
278. See Elura Nanos, A High School Cheerleader’s F-Bombs on Snapchat Could Blow
Up Free Speech for U.S. Students, L. & CRIME (Dec. 28, 2020), (“A student participating in a school-sponsored extracurricular activity may face limited free-speech
rights, but one entirely on her own does not.”); see also Thomas Whitley, NBA Takes
A Stand Vs. Social Justice, RAIDER REV. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://erhsraider.org/
14575/sports/nba-takes-a-stand-vs-social-justice/ [https://perma.cc/9P42-T6NM]
(describing fellow student-athlete’s idea of advocating social justice as “posting
videos”).
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A. Shaking Up the Legal Framework
The Third Circuit stands alone in its broad, pro-student-athlete
holding.279 Mahanoy III might garner the Supreme Court’s attention to finally resolve the contentious issue of whether students may
be free to post on social media without fear of repercussion.280
This opinion splits various appellate courts, leaving unequal protection for students within the Third Circuit and, say, the Second Circuit.281 The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
account for 55.6% of public schools, 54.8% of school teachers, and
56.3% of public schoolchildren in the country and affirm a school’s
authority to regulate off-campus speech under Tinker.282 The presence of a circuit split may increase confusion among the circuits,
though Third Circuit schools benefit from the new rule.283 Contrary to critics’ arguments, the Third Circuit explicitly held nothing
in its opinion detracts from schools’ vast discretionary authority to
regulate speech within the school context.284
279. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 196 (Ambro, J., concurring) (“[The Third
Circuit] is the first Circuit Court to hold that Tinker categorically does not apply to
off-campus speech. A few Circuits have flirted with such a holding and have declined to apply Tinker to off-campus speech on a case-by-case basis. . . . [H]owever,
those same Circuit Courts have subsequently applied Tinker to off-campus
speech.”).
280. See Robert B. Nussbaum, Third Circuit Upholds Public School Student’s First
Amendment Rights, TRENDING L. BLOG , https://trendinglawblog.com/2020/09/01/
third-circuit-upholds-public-school-students-first-amendment-rights/ [https://
perma.cc/L69J-PM7C] (Sept. 1, 2020) (noting decision might lead to Supreme
Court resolving circuit split).
281. See Sophia Cope, In Historic Opinion, Third Circuit Protects Public School Students’ Off-Campus Social Media Speech, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 31, 2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/07/historic-opinion-third-circuit-protectspublic-school-students-campus-social-media [https://perma.cc/P5MU-E36J]
(highlighting Third Circuit’s conflict with other circuits).
282. See Digest of Education Statistics 2019, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (2019)
(describing relevant statistics about makeup of schools, teachers, and students in
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits). For further discussion of these
circuits’ approaches, see supra notes 63-104 and accompanying text.
283. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 196-97 (Ambro, J., concurring) (cautioning
opinion may “sow confusion” and leave more questions unanswered than answered). For further discussion of Third Circuit’s emphasis on providing clarity to
students, teachers, and administrators, see supra notes 194-200 and accompanying
text.
284. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 190 (majority opinion) (“Nothing in this
opinion questions school officials’ ‘comprehensive authority’ to regulate students
when they act or speak within the school environment.” (quoting J.S. v. Blue Mt.
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011))); see also Cope, supra note 281 (stating
schools may still discipline students who share or react to off-campus speech in way
disruptive to school environment). For further discussion of Mahanoy III’s recognition and respect for school’s “comprehensive authority” over on-campus speech
and possible exceptions to off-campus speech involving threats of violence, see
supra 201-202 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, this opinion will transform the education law
field and perhaps cause hesitation in administrators who would like
to discipline students for social media usage.285 Third Circuit educators will have to re-craft their student discipline policies to comport with Mahanoy III and policies restricting student-athlete social
media usage may be revised or removed altogether.286 As an out-ofcircuit example, the University of Iowa recently lifted an otherwise
broad ban on football players’ Twitter usage following public scrutiny and backlash.287 Mahanoy III may place indirect pressure on
schools to rescind such rules in order to avoid legal battles.288
Finally, the Third Circuit’s divergence from other circuits’ approaches makes it more likely that the Supreme Court will enter the
arena and resolve the circuit split.289 The Mahanoy Area School
District has already filed a writ for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.290 Given the Third Circuit’s diametrically opposed ap285. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 194 (noting parents have primary responsibility in teaching children civility and schools must be careful to not transform its
legitimate authority to “quash student expression deemed crude or offensive—
which far too easily metastasizes into the power to censor valuable speech and
legitimate criticism”). For further discussion of previously permissible, but potentially unconstitutional, school disciplinary action under the Third Circuit’s standard, see supra notes 197-199 and accompanying text.
286. See Pet. for Writ of Cert., Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., No. 20-255, at
18 (Aug. 28, 2020) (“Absent this Court’s immediate intervention, those schools
must now jettison the disciplinary policies they have relied on to protect student
welfare.”).
287. See Chad Leistikow, Iowa Football: Kirk Ferentz Places Chris Doyle on Administrative Leave, Lifts Twitter Ban, HAWK CENTRAL (June 6, 2020), https://
www.hawkcentral.com/story/sports/college/iowa/football/2020/06/06/iowafootballs-chris-doyle-placed-administrative-leave-by-kirk-ferentz-begin-culturalshift/3166432001/ [https://perma.cc/NLR2-T52V] (noting University of Iowa’s
removal of student-athlete Twitter ban following controversy surrounding team’s
policy restricting players from tweeting on social justice issues); see also Letter to the
University of Iowa, FOUND. FOR INDIV. RIGHTS IN EDUC. (June 8, 2020), https://
www.thefire.org/fire-letter-to-the-university-of-iowa-june-8-2020/ [https://
perma.cc/AFP2-H9X4] (asking for clarification on university’s decision to lift ban
and allow football players one pre-approved tweet in response to requests to speak
on racial injustice).
288. See Br. of Amici Curiae Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n et al, supra note 267, at 9-10
(“And a school that believes itself to be within Tinker’s exception could end up
facing a costly and burdensome lawsuit.”).
289. See Cope, supra 281 (noting chance that Supreme Court will review writs
of certiorari).
290. See Pet. for Writ of Cert., supra note 286, at 1 (requesting Supreme Court
to grant certiorari to resolve question of whether Tinker applies to off-campus
speech). The Supreme Court granted B.L.’s request to extend their response time
to November 30, 2020. See Mot. to Extend Respondent’s Time to File Br. in Opp.
to the Pet. for Writ of Cert., Mahanoy, No. 20-255 (Sept. 21, 2020) (requesting
extension to file opposing brief in light of ACLU’s upcoming election litigation
concerns). B.L. filed a response to the school district’s petition, claiming there
was no circuit split and the case was not appropriate in determining whether Tinker
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proach to the other circuits, the gravity of the issue, the rapid expansion of social media usage and access, and the Supreme Court’s
last student speech case was decided thirteen years ago, the Supreme Court will likely grant certiorari and hopefully deliver some
finality.291
While it is impossible to accurately predict the Supreme
Court’s ruling on the matter, the Court will likely affirm the Third
Circuit’s decision.292 The primary justification for this prediction is
the factual uniqueness of this case and the impact an opposite ruling will have on students’ free speech rights.293 Namely, none of
the other Supreme Court cases involved speech outside the schoolsupervised or -controlled context.294 Furthermore, none of those
applied to off-campus speech because B.L.’s Snap did not cause a substantial disruption. See Br. in Opp. to the Pet. for Writ. of Cert., Mahanoy, No. 20-255 (Nov.
30, 2020) (emphasizing case was poor vehicle for resolving whether Tinker applies
to off-campus speech). The school district responded, continuing to allege the
decision created a circuit split, presents an important constitutional issue, and was
incorrect. See Reply Br. for Pet., Mahanoy, No. 20-255 (Dec. 14, 2020) (asking
Court to grant for writ of certiorari to resolve important constitutional question).
All material was distributed to the Justices for their January 8, 2021 conference,
where they will decide whether to grant the school district’s petition for the highest court’s review. See Nanos, supra note 278 (“When the justices reconvene after
their holiday break, they will consider the case in their first conference of the new
year.”).
291. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400-01 (2007) (noting student
speech case involved normal school hours, was an approved school event, and
teachers and administrators supervised event).
292. See Adam Liptak, A Cheerleader’s Vulgar Message Prompts a First Amendment
Showdown, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/28/us/
supreme-court-schools-free-speech.html [https://perma.cc/ZB6W-HVVG] (noting
Supreme Court, despite post-Tinker trilogy’s siding with schools, “has a reputation
for being protective of First Amendment rights” and tends to review important
constitutional issues causing circuit splits).
293. Compare Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining B.L.
made Snap outside school grounds, after school hours, and without school resources), with Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44-45 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting several student council members met in computer lab during school hours to send
email convincing students to call principal after principal cancelled popular school
event), and Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35-36 (2d
Cir. 2007) (noting student used AOL Instant Messenger, program allowing users
to send messages only to pre-approved friends, whereas current social media usage
allows entire public to view various posts).
294. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 396 (“At a school-sanctioned and school-supervised
event, a high school principal saw some of her students unfurl a large banner
conveying a message she reasonably regarded as promoting illegal drug use.”)
(emphasis added); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988)
(noting school may exercise editorial control over “school-sponsored publications,
theatrical publications, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school”); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986) (describing student
speech delivered during official school assembly); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
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cases involved speech uttered during the weekend.295 Also, the rise
of social media presents unique problems that may potentially subject students and student-athletes to disciplinary action, such as suspension or removal, respectively, only for sharing an opinion to
one’s limited group of friends.296 Finally, the Supreme Court’s recent addition of an originalist Justice may increase the odds of a
favorable disposition for student speech, especially when considering the possibility of allowing a school’s regulatory authority to extend into one’s home for merely mentioning the school.297
B. Freeing Student-Athletes From Speech Suppression
Mahanoy III allows students to post, Tweet, or Snap distasteful
comments or pictures without fear of arbitrary retaliation and empowers students to use social media to advocate for social justice.298
No longer does the First Amendment authorize schools to “censor
any disfavored student speech in exchange for the ability to particiCmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (explaining students wore black armbands in school).
295. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 397 (noting event took place “while school was in
session”); Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 262, 266 (describing newspaper publication as part
of school’s curriculum and reaffirming Fraser’s holding that schools cannot censor
speech outside school, inferring publication was always worked on exclusively during school hours on school grounds (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685)); Fraser, 478
U.S. at 677 (noting student gave lewd speech at assembly during normal school
day); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (explaining students returned to school during normal school week wearing black armbands).
296. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 189 (“Recent technological changes reinforce, not weaken, [the] conclusion [Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech]
. . . We are equally mindful, however, that new communicative technologies open
new territories where regulators might seek to suppress speech they consider inappropriate, uncouth, or provocative.”).
297. See Three Seventh Circuit Cases Showcase Judge Amy Coney Barrett’s Willingness
to Expand Free Speech Protections in Certain Contexts, INST. FOR FREE SPEECH (Sept. 23,
2020), https://www.ifs.org/blog/cases-judge-coney-barrett-expand-free-speechprotections/ [https://perma.cc/9VYW-Z22P] (analyzing then-Judge Barrett’s involvement with three free speech cases suggesting she is in favor of more First
Amendment protections); see also Adams v. Bd. of Educ. of Harvey Sch. Dist. 152,
968 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2020) (showing then-Judge Barrett’s joining of Judge
Easterbrook’s holding that public employees do not automatically lose free speech
rights solely because speech implicates some matter of public concern).
298. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 189-90 (emphasizing Third Circuit’s ruling
provides clarity to students to know whether speech they are about to engage in
may subject them to school discipline); see also Goldstein, supra note 263 (warning
other schools should consider changing their policies on student-athlete social media usage); Letter to the University of Iowa, supra note 287 (placing pressure on University of Iowa for position on social media usage and requesting all open records
regarding football team’s Twitter ban).
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pate in extracurricular activities.”299 Furthermore, the Third Circuit’s bright-line rule provides “upfront clarity” in giving fair notice
to students so there is no ambiguity on whether certain speech may
be subject to discipline.300 Similar to professional athletes, studentathletes can use their platforms within the school to be catalysts for
positive social change.301 Additionally, Mahanoy III allows coaches
to create a comfortable environment for student-athletes where
they will not air grievances over social media and educate students
on positive uses and negative abuses of social media.302 School officials should take affirmative measures to avoid potential legal battles in a way that encourages students to use social media to
advance certain causes without infringing their First Amendment
rights.303 For example, coaches should educate each student-athlete prior to the regular season so they know early on how to use
social media responsibly, such as waiting twenty-four hours prior to

299. Br. of Amicus Curiae Found. for Indiv. Rights in Educ., Mahanoy III, 964
F.3d 170, at 19 (Aug. 28, 2019) (warning schools may not unconstitutionally condition extracurricular participation on acceptable speech).
300. Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d at 189 (stating its rule enables students to know
whether certain speech could subject them to school discipline).
301. See Our Approach, CMTY. MATTERS, https://community-matters.org/
about/our-approach/ [https://perma.cc/E36Y-WQNC] (last visited Dec. 8, 2020)
(explaining program empowering young student-athletes with leadership values
and ability to change social norms).
302. See Kevin DeShazo, Are You Empowering or Overpowering Your Student Athletes on Social Media?, F I E L D H O U S E M E D I A (Oct. 27, 2014), https://
www.fieldhousemedia.net/are-you-empowering-or-overpowering-your-student-athletes-on-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/UX3U-DCG9] (encouraging coaches to
urge students to positively use social media); see also Michael Gaio, Blog: 9 Social
Media Dos and Don’ts for Student-Athletes, https://www.athleticbusiness.com/corporate/blog-9-social-media-dos-and-don-ts-for-student-athletes.html [https://
perma.cc/BR32-UJR5] (Oct. 2013) (explaining ways educators and coaches may
instruct student-athletes on positive ways to use social media).
303. See, e.g., Andy Buhler, Students Launch Social Media Campaign to Urge State
Officials to Allow Return of High School Sports in Washington, SCOREBOOK LIVE (Dec.
11, 2020), https://washington.scorebooklive.com/2020/12/11/students-launchsocial-media-campaign-to-urge-state-officials-to-allow-return-of-high-school-sportsin-washington/ [https://perma.cc/VK7C-WFFF] (noting high school athletes used
social media to urge Washington governor and state department to amend
COVID-19 restrictions for sports); see also Adam Juratovac, How High School Coaches
Can Create and Enforce Social Media Policies, https://blogs.usafootball.com/blog/
2062/how-high-school-coaches-can-create-and-enforce-social-media-policies
[https://perma.cc/5LJ6-TKRV] (Nov. 9, 2016) (“This subject [of crafting social
media policies] is intricate because coaches can not restrict their student-athletes
from posting on social media because those restrictions infringe on student-athletes’ free speech rights. However, coaches can instill guiding principles for their
student-athletes on social media use that can be more effective than stringent
rules.”).
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posting potentially emotionalized content and not posting anything
their parent would not want to see.304
The Third Circuit went leaps and bounds in advocating for student-athlete speech rights, especially those engaged in extracurricular activities, and hopefully attracted the attention of the Supreme
Court.305 This case is a stepping-stone for nationwide recognition
of the importance of student-athlete free speech rights.306 The
Third Circuit delivered a grand slam for student-athletes by affirming they do not lose their First Amendment rights by participating in sports.307 Now, the ball is in the Supreme Court.308
Nicolas Burnosky*
304. See Nelson Gord, NCSA: Five Social Media Lessons for Coaches, USA TODAY
HIGH SCH. SPORTS (Nov. 12, 2019), https://usatodayhss.com/2019/ncsa-five-socialmedia-lessons-for-coaches [https://perma.cc/Z4QS-Q3NU] (highlighting several
ways coaches may build successful sports program by teaching responsible social
media use).
305. See Emilee Larkin, Snapchatting Cheerleader Wins Free-Speech Case at 3rd Circuit, COURTHOUSE NEWS (June 30, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/
snapchatting-cheerleader-wins-free-speech-case-at-third-circuit/ [https://
perma.cc/W47J-5EY2] (describing opinion as “enormously important for the
safety and welfare of young people everywhere” (quoting Frank LoMonte, director
of Brechner Center for Freedom of Information)).
306. See Cope, supra note 281 (“The Third Circuit’s opinion is historic because it is the first federal appellate court to affirm that the substantial disruption
exception from Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech.”).
307. See Mahanoy III, 964 F.3d 170, 182 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding reduced free
speech rights when participating in extracurricular activities runs counter to wellestablished First Amendment principles).
308. See Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., SCOTUSBLOG, https://
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mahanoy-area-school-district-v-b-l/ [https://
perma.cc/H2TA-PXYM] (last visited Feb. 4, 2020) (listing petition as “GRANTED”
on Jan. 8, 2021).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A in Political Science, Temple University, 2019. I would like to dedicate
this Note to my fiancé, Rachel, for her unyielding love and unwavering support,
without whom I would not have had the drive and dedication to have this Note
published.
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